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# Near East/North Africa Report

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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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## REFUGEES URGED TO RETURN TO LIBERATED PARTS OF HOMELAND

Tehrar KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 7 Mar 82 p 4

[Interview with Brother Mazare of the "Nasr" Organization]

[Text]

Brother Mazare, as representative from the "Nasr Organization" of Afghanistan while on a visit to Iran in commemoration of the Third Anniversary of the Islamic Revolution of Iran ceremonies spoke regarding the situation in his homeland, Afghanistan.

Q: Would you tell us about the latest events and news of Afghanistan, please?

A: Now, two years have elapsed since the beginning of the war and bloodshed in Afghanistan. During this period the Russians have made no progress and have been forced to adopt a defensive stance from an offensive position. They concentrate their forces in big towns and around highways and after launching some attacks incur casualties and kill some people.

At night guerrilla operations are carried out. In this period the Russians have played many roles. They proposed "National Front: the country's father." They said they were willing to have friendly relations with "patriotic land owners." The brains of "the National Front: the country's father" is Babrak Karmal whose aim was to attract landowners and feudal lords. But this plan turned out to be of no use. They called up the persons who had completed their compulsory military service during the past 8 years and gave them rials 15,000 each. The Afghan regime paid a whole month's salary to those who were

government employees. In the first week after the call-up more than 63 thousand people abandoned the (Kabul). They arrested some, but later they fled away. The population of Kabul is more than 500,000.

Q: How is the economic situation of the Afghan people?

A: It is not good at all. The warring parties have completely destroyed each other's belongings. In the Shi'ite-inhabited areas wheat cannot be grown and barley is seldom grown. The price of foodstuffs is very excessive in the towns. Wheat sells for rials 70 per kilo in the town, but it is cheaper in rural areas. The villagers are short of salt and tea. They mostly eat barley bread in villages.

At present the population of Afghanistan is about 18 million. Of course no precise census has been carried out. Out of this number, nearly 6 million are Shi'i who live frugally.

Q: What are the basic aims of the Afghan strugglers?

A: The demand of the noble strugglers and that of the nation are the same, i.e., the establishment of the Islamic rule on the basis of Islamic orders and a policy defined by the Islamic ideology. This is the same "neither East nor West" policy.

The Afghan people enjoy a high morale versus the foreign forces. Once they discover that the least bit of foreign dependence exist,

they stand against it. There are noble groups in Afghanistan who follow the line of the nation that is the true Islam independent of the West and East.

The Afghan people are neither contended with the foreign mass media's words, or approach and sympathy with Afghanistan. On the other hand both the super-powers and some countries of the region are intent on taking advantage of this condition. Therefore under various pretexts, the super-powers try to mislead the Afghan people by means of propaganda, their agents and the reactionary regimes of the region.

There are several deviant lines in the revolution of Afghanistan. It is essential for those who endeavor either inside or outside Afghanistan for the establishment of an Islamic rule in this country, to know these devious lines so that the people's revolution will not go astray.

Of course the devious groups who use an Islamic guise are made up of both the partisans of the West and the advocates of packaged ideologies. Today one of the most horrible calamities of Afghanistan is caused by these very deviant groups.

With its 100,000 troops, Russia has not been able to do anything, but these devious groups take advantage of tribal and religious differences. The blows we have received from them are heavier than the Russians.

In the region I was living, they instigated conflict between the Shi'i and Sunni people two times and 400 houses were burned. Of course those who received arms from foreigners and waged the conflict were feudal lords and Khans. This event left a heavy impression on the people. Such events cause the people to feel hatred toward the revolutionary currents. The agents of foreigners try to make people pessimistic towards the Islamic Revolution so that they can find favor with any rule which ensures their security. The devious groups commit robbery and meanwhile the government propagates that the Mujahideen are thieves, in order to assassinate the robe character of the Mujahideen. The coalition groups, too, work under the name of Islam. In the same region that we were, the Maoists opened a front. A clash was launched between the "Nasr" organization and the Maoists and as a result five of them were killed and 18 were captured and the rest fled away, while we had one wounded.

We were intent on trying these 18 and giving them their justice due. We carried out necessary investigations, but the very parties who are the U.S. agents, with the collaboration of the feudal lords of the region did not let us try them. Those 18 persons had confessed themselves that they were members of the "Sho'leh" and "Saman" groups. But the devious groups claimed and announced through leaflets that "they were Muslims" !! As a result they launched a chaos in the region and we were compelled to release those 18. We have the documents of this event in our hands.

Q: What factors have caused such a large number of the Afghan people to leave their homes and immigrate to other countries?

A: Various factors inside Afghanistan have caused the people to migrate. One factor was the Russians' sudden invasion which terrified the people and caused them to think that the Mujahideen could not resist vis-a-vis this attack.

The second factor was the issues relating to the compulsory military service and the call-up of

people. Those who lived in the towns and could not tolerate rural life, fled to foreign countries. The third factor was the existence of devious and counterrevolutionary groups who forced the people to flee. Because there were a series of Russian plans for land distribution. The people were forced to accept the lands, but the pro-U.S. groups and the feudal lords threatened the people that, "Why have you got the land? You are the agents of Babrak's government." They attacked the people and accused them of being members of the "Khalq" and "Parcham" parties. They killed a number of them and wounded many others. The people who did not accept to take sides with the Russians due to their marxist and atheistic nature, were compelled to migrate. These people were poor and were ready to fight against the aggressors. The noble Islamic groups announced that the belongings of Davood, Zaher Shah and Babrak Karmal were all illegitimate, thus nobody could take back the land that the people had taken possession of during the era of Davood, Zaher and Babrak.

The Islamic groups said, "After the victory of the revolution Islam will have plans of its own for these lands. The one who has possessed the land through a legitimate way, will retain his ownership and the one who has usurped the land in an illegitimate way for example by bribery or by force, will be deprived of his ownership and the land will belong to the Islamic government which will respectively entrust it to the oppressed."

Therefore, by issuing leaflets we prevented the people's flight and now we advise our brothers who have migrated to return to their own country. Because many areas of the country have been liberated. They can carry out their trade and farming there and help the Islamic Revolution as far as possible. The Muslim strugglers have the power to defend them and prevent anyone from doing them wrong.

We ask the neighbor countries especially the Islamic Republic of

Iran to help the Afghan migrants from the cultural point of view. This action will be in the interest of the Islamic Revolution. The migrants' remaining abroad are of no help for the Islamic Revolution in Afghanistan.

If the towns be evacuated it will be in the Russians' interest and will cause the relations and cooperation between the people and Mujahideen to weaken. Therefore, we do not see our brothers' staying abroad useful.

Q: You know that King Hussein of Jordan has recently announced that he will send his soldiers to Saddam's help. Please express your viewpoint in this regard and also about the war of the Iraqi regime against Iran.

A: The issue of the aid of Jordan and Saudi to Iraq is not anything new. Like the time of Taraki and Hafizullah Amin who were the agents of Russia and received supplied and equipment from Russia and used them against us. But it was hidden from the people that their fight was in fact Russia's fight. However, when Russia entered Afghanistan, the curtain was removed. The forces were the same, but the fact was revealed to the people. The issue of the Iraqi imposed war is of the same nature.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been fighting against the U.S. from the very beginning. But now this fact has completely been disclosed.

With its now 17-month-old resistance, the Islamic Republic has emerged victorious in all its operations such that even the Western media has acknowledged the military dominance.

Therefore this war will end in the interest of the Islamic Republic. Insha'Allah, and after the victory, nobody will dare disturb you.

Q: In conclusion, do you wish to mention any other topics of interest to our readers?

A: Since the Afghan society has a religious nature and the

superpowers cannot understand this point, their efforts will lead to nothing.

The people of Afghanistan have a great deal of affection towards the Imam that should anybody want to participate in the struggle, he will have to relate himself to the Imam. In conclusion we want the officials of the Islamic Republic to broadcast Farsi programs for us through Radio Zabol.

CSO: 4600/325

## EXTENSIVE VICTORIES CLAIMED FOR MUJAHEDIN IN PROVINCES

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 8 Mar 82 p 4

[Text]

LONDON (AAP) — During the first two weeks of last month different Mujahideen organizations in Qandahar province killed 41 Karmal and four Soviet troops.

In Qandahar, Khalq party General Secretary, Fazal Ahmad, was captured together with two other people. A tank and a jeep were destroyed and another jeep was seized by the Mujahideen.

In the middle of last month Afghan freedom fighters fired rockets at a place near Qandahar camp prison, and tank and a jeep were destroyed.

Mujahideen of the Islamic Unity killed four Khalqis in the city, launching the attack in broad daylight. They attacked the Dund police station in the middle of the month, and five Afghan soldiers were killed in the attack. An army vehicle was destroyed at the Grishik bus stand in Qandahar, and three troops boarding the bus were killed. At Gamrak on the same day three Karmal army officers and two soldiers were killed in a guerrilla operation.

The Mujahideen suddenly surrounded a jeep in the Pashmol area of Qandahar and captured the General Secretary of the Qandahar Khalq party, Fazal Ahmad, together with two companions, Lal Mohammad and Ghias. They were handed over to the Islamic court in the area which will hold their trial. Earlier, in the old bazaar of Qandahar, a tank was destroyed by mines. The bodies of four Soviets were recovered from the remains. Two Afghan soldiers were shot dead at Kunargan.

According to information received from the Punjwai subdivision of Qandahar province, a Karmal force led by Soviet officers encircled a guerrilla force led by Maulavi Said Mohammad of Harkat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami at Zalkhana. Fierce fighting continued until sunset, and 25 communists were killed and six Mujahidees were also killed. Those killed included two Mujahids from the Fidayaan-e-Islam, who had come to the spot after hearing gun shot and whose reinforcement helped the Mujahideen break the siege.

**Wardak Province**

The Mujahideen of Wardak province shot down two helicopter gunships and a Mig plane in a surprise operation.

It is reported that in the third week of last month seven helicopter gunships and four Mig planes bombed Akhund Zad Kot for about one and a half hours. The bombing was aimed at silencing the anti-aircraft guns of the Hezb-e-Islami Mujahideen installed 25 kilometres distant from Fehdabad to shoot down invading helicopters and aircraft. But the Soviets did not succeed in their mission. The Mujahideen shot down two helicopters which were circling over the area. The wreckage of the helicopters fell in the nearby mountains. In the evening, when four Mig planes flew over the area to bomb it, the Mujahideen used anti-aircraft guns, badly damaging a Mig plane, which later fell 20 kilometres away.

Early in the morning of the next

day the Soviets launched a helicopter attack, as a result of which six people were killed and a mosque demolished. The dead included two women and two children. The mother of the local Mujahideen commander, Zakirullah, was killed. The next day the Soviets bombed the Narkh area for several hours, resulting in the total destruction of six villages. An eyewitness said that 70% of the houses in the area were razed to the ground.

#### **Balkh Province**

The Mujahideen have gained control of the whole of Balkh province, with the exception of the Daulatabad sub-division.

According to reports received from Mazar Shariff, headquarters of Balkh province, Soviet army units are also under siege by the Mujahideen and they have to use tanks to reach the provincial headquarters. During the last year about half a dozen gunship helicopters have been shot down in the area, while over 2,000 Soviet troops have been killed.

It is reported that the Jamial-e-Islami provincial Commander, Zabihullah, has created terror for the Soviets and caused a number of problems for them. Launching successful operations, the commander has so far been able to snatch arms, ammunition, foodstuffs and oil from the government troops, to the value of millions of dollars.

The Soviets were using the services of Afghan drivers for the supply of arms, ammunition and the foodstuffs, but the Mujahideen commander frustrated their intentions. The Mujahideen adopted a novel strategy for dealing with this. They let the Afghan

drivers through their area but later deprived them of their vehicles, issuing them with receipts for the vehicles and their contents.

The Soviets have Zabihullah's signature and stamp to verify the drivers' claim that the commander has deprived them of the vehicles.

#### **Takhar Province**

Bloody clashes have been continuing between Soviet troops and Mujahideen in different parts of Takhar province in Afghanistan.

Ever since the freedom fighters upgraded their pressure in this province bordering the Soviet Union, helicopter gunships and Mig planes have been flying directly from Uzbekistan's airport to strike at the Mujahideen positions and civilian areas. During the last week of December and the first week of January four areas of Chah Aab sub-division, Pashaf, Injeer, Takhan Abad and Urg, were completely destroyed by Soviet bombing. It is estimated that over 1,400 houses were razed to the ground and over 200 civilians were killed. Most of the population had already moved to relatively safe places.

The Mujahideen say they have control of major part of the province, but Soviet troops have been making frantic efforts to capture Chah Aab sub-division, located between the Amu and Kokchah rivers. The Soviets are engaged in cutting trees and burning orchards everywhere so that the guerrillas making surprise attacks should have no place to hide.

The Soviet troops are reported to have dropped napalm bombs over an area of Takhan Abad, killing 21 civilians. Soviet fighter planes, often numbering up to 20, are frequently seen all over the province engaged in bombing.



## BRIEFS

SOVIET MILITARY COSTS--Karachi, 7 Mar--The Soviet Union is spending 700 million rupees daily on military operations against the mujahidin guerrilla forces in Afghanistan. This was revealed to the MASHRIQ staff reporter during his visit to Afghan refugee camps where he met with several Afghans who recently came from various parts of their homeland. The MASHRIQ correspondent, who together with several journalists from Punjab and Sind provinces visited several Afghan refugee camps in the Frontier Province, discovered that the Soviets are sustaining heavy losses all over Afghanistan both in personnel and material. The Afghan refugees told the correspondent that at the time when the Soviet forces had first entered Afghanistan they had not expected such stiff resistance. They had come in with ordinary arms and equipment and had expected to gain control of the situation within a short time. However, the stiff resistance encountered in Afghanistan forced the Soviets to send back home some of their inadequate equipment and to replace it with sophisticated weapons. This increased their expenses considerably. At present, according to informed estimates, the Soviet Union is spending some 700 million rupees daily in Afghanistan, which is having an effect on the Soviet economy at home. The Afghan refugees felt that the Soviets cannot sustain such losses for long. [Text] [GF160558 Karachi MASHRIQ in Urdu 8 Mar 82 p 1]

ENVOYS AT PARTY PLENARY--According to a report, DRA Ambassador to the Soviet Union Dr Habib Mangal; DRA Ambassador to Sofia (Emteyas) Hasan; DRA Ambassador to Budapest Jailani Bakhtari; DRA representative to the United Nations Farid (Zarif); DRA Ambassador to Berlin Mohammad Shafiq; DRA Ambassador to Baghdad 'Abdol Hadi Mokammel; DRA Ambassador to Warsaw Mohammad Ayan Ayan; DRA Consul General to Delhi Hashmat (Aurang); DRA Charge d'Affaires in Bonn 'Enayet (Shadab); DRA Charge d'Affaires in Tehran Mas'ud Ranjbar; and DRA Consul in Peshawar Sarfaraz Mohmand have arrived in Kabul to participate in the party's plenary session. [Text] [GF111845 Kabul in Urdu to South Asia 1330 GMT 11 Mar 82]

CSO: 4656/5

## ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DISCUSSES DISCREPANCIES IN BUREAUCRACY

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 20 Jan 82 p 3

/Article by Ahmad Nasr-al-Din: "Organization and Administration Agency Experts Announce a Changeover Among Higher Administrative Leaders in Egypt"/

/Text/ What is the identity of higher administrative leaders in the government and public sector?

The question has been raised by the strange contradictions that actually exist in the world of employees. There is a member of a board of directors who is no more than 19 years of age, and there are members of boards who possess no qualifications besides birth certificates occupying first class seats!

The picture ultimately has been accurately mapped out by two important studies which experts with the Central Organization and Administration Agency have prepared. These delineate the features, forms and natures of these leaders. The two studies reveal a brilliant fact, which is that there will be a complete change-over in higher management in the next 5 years; the reason is that 80 percent of the deputy ministers will be transferred to retirement by the end of 1984!

Other strange discrepancies that experts have revealed on the members of the boards of directors, as well, are that there is a manufactured goods merchant who is a member of the board of a public sector company in Dumyat and al-Mansurah and that there are four foreigners on the board of directors of an oil company!

The first study, at the outset, claims that the total number of people working in higher management positions, those of director general and above, in the government and public sectors, comes to 7,623, of whom 2,590 are deputy and first deputy ministers in the government, or 34 percent of the total, and 5,033 are directors general and board chairmen in the public sector, or 66 percent of the total.

#### Where Do the Deputy Ministers Work?

The study shows that 59 percent of these leaders, totalling 1,523 in number, are working in the central government, 17 percent of them, or 432, are working in service authorities, and 635, or 25 percent of the total of these higher-level leaders, are working in the economic authorities as deputy ministers. They are 2,590 deputy ministers and first deputy ministers in number.

If these leaders are broken down among the various grades of employment staffs, it becomes apparent that 555 of them possess the grade of first deputy minister, 2,120 are at the deputy minister grade and 4,948 are directors general, or 65 percent of the total, which comes to 7,623.

#### The Critical Age and Transfer to Retirement

The study sets out a number of important, serious observations which manifest themselves in the following points. One, it has been observed that more than half the first deputy ministers in the government sector, and an equivalent number in the public sector, are expected to retire by 1984. The serious point here lies in the fact that their substitution rate will have to exceed 50 percent a year but does not now exceed 10 percent a year. The question which presents itself in an urgent fashion is, will these positions remain vacant? That is what one would expect, if not all of these bodies realize, as of now, how many of their people will be transferred to retirement up to the end of 1984 who are now occupying these important administrative leadership grades in the government and the public sector of the state.

Two, it is also apparent that the proportion of first deputy ministers who are expected to be transferred to retirement in the government sector is larger than that in the public sector for the same period, 1981-84. More than two-thirds of the heads of service authorities will reach retirement age before 1984, 62.5 percent of those in economic authorities, 57.5 percent of those in the central government, and 43.7 percent of the board chairmen of the economic units in the public section.

The same thing, though to a lesser degree, applies to deputy ministers and people occupying high grades: apparently 602 of the total deputy ministers and people at their level in the government and public sectors will be transferred to retirement before the end of 1984, for a general ratio of 38.5 percent in the general authorities, 30.6 percent in the central government, 40.4 percent in the service authorities, and 37.4 percent in the economic authorities, in the coming 5 years, 1981-1984.

#### General Directors Also

As for directors-general who are expected to be transferred to retirement by 1984, the Central Organization and Administration Agency experts have discovered that they total 1,225 in number, which is about half again as large as the total number of first deputy ministers and people at the corresponding level who are expected to be transferred to retirement in the same period. Nonetheless, the percentage of those who are expected to be transferred to retirement in the same period does not exceed one quarter the total of directors general in the two sectors, who are 4,948 in number.

The study showed that the number of people occupying higher positions who are expected to be transferred to retirement in the public and government sectors is 2,105, a number which greatly exceeds one quarter of the total persons occupying higher management positions. That is, the rate of annual transfer to retirement in these positions comes to 5.5 percent of the total number of these positions in the government and public sectors. It is also apparent that the ratio of transfers



to retirement in the government sector to those in the public sector during the same period is 22 percent in the public sector, or an annual rate of 4.4 percent, and 38.9 percent in the public sector, or an annual rate of 7.8 percent. It is apparent that the annual retirement rate is roughly 7.9 percent in the central government and service authorities alike, while the rate in the economic authorities is lower, totalling 35.7 percent of all the people occupying higher positions, which is about 3.2 percent below the rate of people who are expected to be retired in the government sector during the same period. This shows that a large number of people occupying higher positions in the public sector, or about 80 percent of them, assume these positions at an early age and that 40 percent of the total number of people occupying positions of higher management in all sectors will reach retirement age before the end of 1984, that is, in the central government and the general service authorities both. In 40 percent of the cases, employees do not occupy a position or grade of director general or above before reaching age 55.

#### Board Chairmen

While this is the picture with respect to deputy ministers and directors general, what is the picture regarding chairmen and members of boards of directors? Regarding them, it has been observed that one member of the board of the al-Nasr Fine Textile Company in Dumyat and al-Mansurah is a merchant in manufactured goods and that there are four foreign board members in the Oriental Petroleum Company, out of a total of 2,845 elected and appointed board members, of whom 54.2 percent are appointed and 45.8 percent are elected. Of these, 30.7 percent are in high grades, until one reaches a proportion of 0.2 percent in Grade Six, in the case of appointees, while 56.2 percent are in high grades, and 49.3 percent occupy Grade Two /positions/, in the case of elected persons.

The study also shows that 14 percent of the total number of people working as board members were in the supply sector, followed by the construction and building materials sector with 11.1 percent, and the chemical and textile industries with 7.8 and 7.6 percent of the total.

#### Members and Chairmen and Their Ages

As regards the ages of chairmen and members of boards, it appears that there are elected board members whose ages do not exceed 19, 23, 27 or 31, and that the ages rise gradually to 65. The number of people below 35 comes to 110. In addition there are 1,223 people, representing 94 percent of the total number of board chairmen and members, who are below 55 in age. The proportion of people whose age ranges from 59 to 63 accounts for 6.4 percent of this total.

#### Grades and Boards

As regards employment staff grades, the number of people appointed to Grade Excellent comes to 53 percent; none of these persons are elected. People in the Higher Grade come to 51.2 percent in the case of appointees and 49.3 percent in the case of elected persons. Finally, in Grade Six, the total comes to 36 percent in the case of elected persons and zero in the case of appointees.

These averages differ from sector to sector. In first place, with respect to appointees, comes the food industry sector, followed by the textile sector, then chemical industries, basic metal industries, mining and petroleum, war production, electricity, the banking sector, the foreign trade sector, cotton, and finally the sector of culture and the media, then communications. In the case of elected persons, these do not differ greatly except that they are confined to the textile sector, with 45 percent, and housing and construction, with 51.5 percent, and are confined to Grade Six in the textile and clothing sector, where the proportion totals 36 percent.

#### Education and Chairmen

In terms of the relationship between chairmen and members of boards and the extent of education and the educational structure, the vital Central Organization and Administration Study has established that among the appointees, there are 17 people with doctorates in Grade Excellent, 12 people with doctorates in the Higher Grade and two directors general, for a total of 31 doctorates. Forty-four have master's degrees, 32 of whom are in Grade Excellent and 21 /sic/ are in the Higher Grade or are directors general, and 35 have higher certificates. In the case of appointees, the number of people who have obtained university degrees are 1,272 in number. Fifty-one members have intermediate certificates, three have certificates below the intermediate level, one has expertise and one is without expertise. The total number of appointed chairmen and members comes to 1,546.

In the case of elected persons, it is apparent that the proportion of people with doctorates to the total number of elected persons, which comes to 2,845, does not exceed 1.2 percent, and that of people with master's degrees does not exceed 1.5 percent. This rises to 59 percent in the case of university graduates, 15.2 percent in the case of intermediate certificates, 7.4 percent in the case of certificates below the intermediate level, and 6.4 percent in the case of people without expertise.

It is also to be observed that 223 working people have obtained credentials above the university level, among people appointed and elected to boards, and that 54 percent of the total, which comes to 4,391, in the public sector possess university credentials, 15.5 percent have intermediate credentials, 7.4 percent of this total have credentials below the intermediate level, and 6.4 percent of the total do not have any credentials.

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CSO: 4504/182

## PUBLIC PROSECUTOR RESPONDS TO SERIOUS QUESTIONS ON COURT EFFICIENCY

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 21 Jan 82 p 3

/Article by Rajat al-Banna: "A Frank Conversation with the Public Prosecutor, on the Sidelines of Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Sulayman's Case"/

/Text/ Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Sulayman's case has raised more than one question, now that public opinion has become a party to it and the concern to follow up on it has turned into a sort of craze that has afflicted everyone who has attended the sessions of the case or read the details of what is going on in it. The man is appearing in front of three bodies that have in succession directed the same charge against him, requiring that he stand before three courts so far, repeating his defense before each one of them. Regardless of whether innocence or guilt is established--and that is the business of the judiciary, and no power except that of law and conscience has any influence over it--how can there be a single charge which three bodies investigate and three courts rule on (and there might perhaps be a fourth or fifth trial on the horizon)?

This was the starting point of the conversation with the public prosecutor, Counsellor Salah al-Rashidi, who is the main person in charge of the power of investigation and indictment in Egypt, the Office of the Public Prosecutor. Questions on and around this case have been pressed upon him, on grounds that it is an excellent example and it has become mandatory that we study it calmly and draw lessons from it in order to protect every citizen in the future from a proliferation of indictment and trial bodies.

Before I began my conversation with Counsellor Salah al-Rashidi, he said, as he was preparing to sit down on his chair, "Ask what you like, but I request you, nothing infringing on the Law on Impropriety, as that is a law that is on the books; nothing infringing on the powers of the socialist prosecutor, which this law regulates; nothing infringing on the justification of the verdict of innocence that has been issued; and, finally, nothing infringing on the basic case, which is still pending before the Office of the Public Prosecutor and on which no ruling has yet been made."

I said, "I will adhere to these caveats and I appreciate the motives for them, but there are inevitable questions. For example, how can the prosecutor's office bring Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Sulayman before the criminal court on the charge of unlawful

gain before it receives the experts' final reports? These are reports which have been presented to the court and here they differ from the original report; isn't it the duty of the prosecutor's office to wait until the experts finish preparing this final report?"

#### The Prosecutor's Office Is Innocent

It seemed as if he had been waiting for this question. Counsellor Salah al-Rashidi picked up a book containing a compendium of penal laws in Egypt and said, with the utmost calm, "First, I am not objecting to the verdict the criminal court recently issued on Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Sulayman's innocence of the charge of acquiring unlawful gain. Second, I want you to know that the office of the prosecutor was not the body that brought this case before the criminal court but rather that it was the Investigation and Examination Commission of the Unlawful Gain Department that did. That is a commission made up of counsellors who are delegated on a part-time basis to examine the statements of financial obligations of people to whom the Law on Unlawful Gain applies, and it is that which is competent to hand over people who are strongly suspected of committing the basic features of the crime of unlawful gain, in execution of its powers as stipulated in Article 14 of Law 62 for 1975 bearing on unlawful gain. This article gives it the power to investigate this sort of crime; it also gives it the power to file cases on the crime before criminal courts if it has the evidence to make an indictment."

I said, "Mr public prosecutor, I would like to understand how a person can go up in front of three bodies to be investigated on one charge. We know that the higher office of the prosecutor of public funds held an investigation on Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Sulayman and that the prosecutor's office took no measures to impose sequestration on his funds. Then an investigation was made on him under the aegis of the Investigation and Examination Commission of the Unlawful Gain Department and that brought him before the criminal court, which ruled that he was innocent. Prior to that an investigation was made on him in the agency of the socialist public prosecutor, which transferred him to the court of values. That ordered the sequestration of his property; the ruling was appealed before the higher court of values, which upheld the imposition of the sequestration. My question is, "Is it in the public interest for a number of investigating and ruling bodies to take charge of interrelated subjects bearing on a single person? This could result in a contradiction in the decrees and provisions of these bodies, as was the case in this matter. Is it proper for a person to be subjected to such an imbroglio?"

Counsellor Salah al-Rashidi removed his glasses, started to point to a group of files on his desk and attempted to explain the issue to me: "Heaven knows, you are right. In principle we must prevent a duplication in areas of specialization. Let me go back to your question. The areas of competence of the agency of the socialist prosecutor and the court of values include political responsibility; the office of the public prosecutor is in charge of investigations and indictments on criminal cases. Article 70 of the constitution stipulates 'Criminal cases will be brought only by order of a judiciary body, except in cases which the law specifies.' The prosecutor's office is one of the basic branches of the judiciary



power and it is essentially concerned with investigating and filing criminal cases. However, there are exceptional instances when the law assigns to other bodies, for instance the investigation and examination commission concerned with unlawful gain, the investigation and filing of cases on some crimes."

Counsellor Salah al-Rashidi quickly qualified the remark: "However, if the gain is unlawful and is the result of a violation of public property, the office of the public prosecutor will have the jurisdiction of investigating aspects related to the public property and will be competent to file a criminal case on them.

"As far as we go, there remain the circumstances related to the issue of preventing accused persons from disposing of or administering their property. In this context, the public prosecutor has the authority to give orders on that in cases of crimes of transgression against public property, as long as the investigation yields up adequate proof of the seriousness of the charge, in accordance with the stipulations of Article 208 (bis) (A) of the Law on Criminal Procedures."

Counsellor Salah al-Rashidi extended a hand to a copy of the Law on Criminal Procedures and pointed to the text. "Let me read: the article says, 'If the investigation yields up adequate proof of the seriousness of the charge regarding crimes of such-and-such or such-and-such, or crimes committed against property owned by the government or public authorities or organizations, units belonging to them or other public legal persons, as a bond for the commitment that may be required in the form of payment of the fine, restitution of property or value of the objects subject to the crime, or for compensation of the body against which the crime has been committed, order that the accused person be prohibited from disposing of or administering his property, or he may order other restrictive measures. He may also order such measures in the case of the property of the accused person's spouse and minor children as a bond for the restitution of amounts or the value of the objects subject to the crime or compensation of the body against which the crime has been committed, as required, unless it is proved that this property has come into their possession from sources other than the property of the accused.'"

#### A Bewildering Question

Unable to conceal my amazement, I asked, "Therefore we are also faced with more than one body that has the right to prevent people from disposing of their property?"

He said, "Yes, the office of the public prosecutor has that right, in the context I have mentioned to you. The investigation and examination commissions of the Unlawful Gain Department have a corresponding power in the case of instances of unlawful gain whose investigation they are in charge of, if they have the right to prohibit the accused person from disposing of or administering his property. Then we have the Law on Impropriety which, in some instances, gives the socialist prosecutor a similar power and the right to request that sequestration be imposed on the property in accordance with a verdict issued by the court of values. That

could happen in instances where the office of the public prosecutor is in charge of investigating these cases. In this situation, the public prosecutor has the power to order that the accused person be prohibited from disposing of or administering his property in execution of Article 208 (bis) (A) of the Law on Criminal Procedures."

I inquired: "Are you frankly satisfied with this situation? Is it compatible with the proper pursuit of justice? Is it compatible with a simple rule, which is to prevent repetition and duplication? Is it compatible with a person's right to go before a single body rather than being torn apart by three bodies at the same time?"

With the utmost calm (for which I envy him), the public prosecutor, Counsellor Salah al-Rashidi, answered, "I agree with you. I consider that in order to prevent duplications in jurisdictions, the office of the public prosecutor should reacquire the jurisdiction it had before issuance of Law 62 on Unlawful Gain for 1975. Prior to that law, the Unlawful Gain Department would inform the public prosecutor's office of the cases in which there was suspicion of illicit gain, so that the public prosecutor's office could take charge of the investigation and evaluate the criminal case itself, determining whether there was proof against the accused, especially since there might be other investigations on the accused which the office of the public prosecutor was carrying out based on the same data. When I was a public attorney with the Higher Office of the Public Funds Prosecutor, the office of the prosecutor happened to bring a bank employee to trial on the two charges of embezzlement and unlawful gain together. He had embezzled close to a million pounds. In spite of that, we found his file in the Unlawful Gain Department, with the indication that he was to be retained because there was no suspicion on him. A verdict of hard labor for life was issued against him by the criminal court."

The public prosecutor smiled and went on, "Perhaps the legislative authorities can rectify that through the proposed amendments to the Law on Unlawful Gain and restore the office of the public prosecutor's right to file criminal cases, in order to eliminate duplications in jurisdictions and prevent the occurrence of contradictions among the decrees of various bodies, consolidating the entity making the transfer /to court/ in the public prosecutor's office alone. This will achieve the goal of coordination and lack of conflict or duplications in joint areas of competence."

There is Duplication

I asked, "What about the socialist prosecutor's agency and its areas of competence?"

He stated, "As regards the agency of the socialist public prosecutor and the court of values, the two of them deal with cases of the political responsibility of individuals and do not deal with criminal cases over which the office of the public prosecutor alone has jurisdiction, and the legislative power, in the preparatory work on the Law Protecting Values from Impropropriety, expressed its desire to avoid any duplication in jurisdictions between the socialist public prosecutor and the court of values on the one hand and the office of the public prosecutor on the other. However, the provisions of the law do contain materials which establish

such duplications. Examples of this are the points I mentioned on the power to forestall the disposition or administration of property or the imposition of sequestration when the matter is related to incidents of transgression against public property. The public prosecutor has the power with respect to this in accordance with Article 208 (bis) (A) of the Law on Criminal Procedures, especially since criminal investigations into these transgressions are under his scrutiny and he is best able to ascertain the circumstances of the accusation and evaluate the evidence on it.

"I sent a memorandum on this to the Ministry of Justice, requesting that the Law Protecting Values from Impropiety be amended so that no body except the public prosecutor would have the power to prevent the accused from disposing of or administering his property if the office of the prosecutor took charge of the investigation on him, in order to prevent a duplication in areas of competence and potential conflicts in decrees."

I asked, "Isn't there a further duplication in the Law on Impropiety, regarding the investigation procedures themselves?"

I Have Prepared a Memorandum

Counsellor Salah al-Rashidi said, "I have prepared a comprehensive memorandum on the various forms of duplication in which I also point to the restriction that Paragraph Three of Article 16 of the Law Protecting Values from Impropiety places on the powers of the office of the public prosecutor regarding investigation and the filing of cases on a number of crimes that infringe upon state security. This stipulation prohibits the office of the public prosecutor from engaging in an investigation into or filing a case on any of these crimes until a request to do so is issued by the socialist public prosecutor. That is a restriction which is in contradiction with the nature of these crimes and the speedy investigation and accumulation of evidence that must occur before they are formulated, in order to avoid procedural restruictions which might delay the start of the investigation. These crimes could take place in remote areas; they could occur at night or during the day. In such cases it might not be feasible to obtain a request from the socialist public prosecutor at the right time. Therefore, in my memorandum, which I sent to the Ministry of Justice, I requested that this restriction be removed in order to realize the public interest in a manner which will give the office of the public prosecutor the power to adopt measures to investigate these crimes without having to wait for the issuance of a request to do so by the socialist public prosecutor."

I asked, "Let us go back to Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Sulayman's case. Does the office of the prosecutor intend to contest the verdict before the court of cassation?"

Counsellor Salah al-Rashidi quickly said "That question is premature because the court has not presented the reasons for the verdict, which we will have to study."

I asked, "Is it true that Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Sulayman's case is still under investigation in the prosecutor's office?"

He stated, "Yes, the case originally started in Administrative Surveillance, by a decree to the effect that Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Sulayman had embezzled government funds allocated to the malaria project, which had originally come from America, and other money from the country of Qatar for the training of its students. The Investigation and Examination Commission of the Unlawful Gain Department, for its part, brought him to trial on a charge of unlawful gain, which was subject to the Law on Unlawful Gain. However, the prosecutor's office is still completing the investigation into the incidents of embezzlement and the appropriation of state property."

I asked, "What does this new investigation lack?"

Counsellor Salah al-Rashidi stated, "This is not a new investigation; this is the old one. It is the first investigation. We are waiting for a report from a committee which the office of the prosecutor has drawn up, composed of university professors and some experts, so that it can set out its final report. This committee's task is to investigate the documents which Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Sulayman has presented, examine the malaria project accounts and investigate the various facets of his defense."

I declared, "People will be amazed, as I am."

In quiet tones, Counsellor Salah al-Rashidi, laying emphasis on every word, said "I hope it is clear that the office of the public prosecutor has not completed the investigation and has not adopted its decree. All that has taken place has happened outside it."

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CSO: 4504/182



U.S., USSR, BRITAIN ASSAILED FOR HELPING KHOMEYNI

(Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 13 Mar 82

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] The NEW YORK TIMES has written that the United States is extending financial assistance to opponents of the Islamic Republic who are abroad, that men of Iran's former armed forces have been (?stationed outside the Iranian borders) and are on alert, that radios opposing the regime and the Tudehis have started operation on the Iranian-Turkish borders, and that the intention is not to destabilize Khomeyni's regime but only to gather information from within Iran. But if Khomeyni's regime falls [the United States] will not remain indifferent. It will enter the scene in order not to let the arena remain empty for opponents of the United States.

Putting what the NEW YORK TIMES has written in a simple language, and for the man on the street to understand, we can say that if Khomeyni's regime was brought to power by the United States, and so far this regime, while giving empty anti-U.S. slogans, has carried out its main missions, which included: Closing down the oil industries; stopping oil exports; dispensing with the construction of nuclear power plants in Iran; breaking up the Iranian armed forces, which were becoming the strongest military power in the Middle East and, in some cases, like its airborne and helicopter forces, the strongest strike unit in the world; and finally, drawing Iraq, which was considered to be Israel's most dangerous enemy on the eastern front, into war.

Saying that antiregime groups in Iran and abroad (?are now) being supported by the United States and that armed units are (?on their toes, ready to start action) [words indistinct] is complementary to the maneuvers that were carried out some time ago by U.S. strike forces in Omani waters. The Reagan administration's intention regarding these two maneuvers is to make the Soviets understand that they should not surpass tolerable limits. The intention is also to make the officials of the Tehran regime continue their cat and mouse game that they are now in the process of, and which does not presently harm vital U.S. interests in any way. But if they do not obey, then they will be crushed with an axe that is raised and ready to strike.

The truth is that not only is it of no importance for the Washington administration if several thousand Iranians are executed by the regime's executioner,

if tens of thousands of innocent people and patriots are imprisoned in the regime's dungeons, if thousands of convicts in the regime's horrific prisons are undergoing continuous torture that go so far as to kill, if women are forced to wear the veil and are occasionally stoned, [words indistinct] opportune and inopportune self-flagellations, if universities are closed down, if famine and sickness have emerged, if several million are refugees and several million others are unemployed--but from many aspects these are all to the benefit of the industrialized and developed world and will at least be to the benefit of the Western world in the short term. Of course such a regime should not be destabilized. Such a regime should drag itself and the country so deeply into the quagmire it has created so that finally the people--men and women, old and young, city-dwellers and villagers, Fars, Torkamans and Azarbayjanis--become disgusted and wish for the former regime with its SAVAK, its moral and material corruption, and all its small and big faults.

The United States [word indistinct] to one day avenge the people whom it itself brought to power and whose shrewd agents--like Ramsey Clark, General Huyser, Sullivan--brought to power its trained hirelings like Mehdi Bazargan, 'Ali Shayegan, Ebrahim Yazdi, and Sadeq Qotbzadeh who took U.S. citizens as hostages for 444 days to settle personal accounts within the regime. However, under present international conditions the United States does not intend in any way to destabilize the regime; in other words, as long as Khomeyni's regime is carrying out its main missions, the most important of which is to weaken anti-Israel Arab Muslim nations, to spread discord in OPEC, and to propagandize [word indistinct] that the self-made bigoted Islam is the best obstacle before communism.

The Soviet Union reacted immediately to this. First, as a warning and declaration of its presence on the scene, it ordered its agents in Iran to purge Ayatollah Rabbani-Shirazi. He had recently become an anticommunist and anti-Tudeh torchbearer. The propaganda machinery of Khomeyni's Islamic Republic, in which Soviet elements have fully infiltrated, was unable to present this crime as an accident despite all its efforts.

The Soviet Union also answered the United States and the NEW YORK TIMES in PRAVDA. Following repeated expressions of concern [words indistinct] Ov Azerbaijan SSR, PRAVDA newspaper--which is actually the spokesman of the USSR Government and the Kremlin (?officials)--wrote that despite all the positive efforts by Moscow and despite the assistance by the Soviet Union and the Eastern communist bloc to the regime of the ayatollahs, Tehran-Moscow relations are not advancing satisfactorily, and that there are some reactionary clergymen around Khomeyni who are preventing the expansion of these relations and the establishment of further good understanding between the two neighboring countries.

Our dear compatriots can understand very well that the USSR does not worry if Khomeyni's regime has carried out the most reactionary reforms in Iran, has chained tens of thousands of Iranians in prisons, [words indistinct], or is sending thousands of Iranian men, women and adolescents--even 10 or 11 year-olds--to the gallows, has made 2 million people refugees or has made

several million face unemployment and poverty. In addition to the closing of Iran's industries, the destruction of Iran's villages, the unrestrained population increase in Tehran's cities and the emergence of slums, the intensification of prostitution and [word indistinct], the closing of universities and the other calamities brought to the Iranian nation by Khomeyni's regime--all these will ultimately strengthen the elements favoring a communist revolution in our country, and in fact accelerate it.

The Iranian Tudeh Party--that is the hand of Moscow in Iran--has supported Khomeyni's regime throughout the 3 years during which Khomeyni's regime has sparked off the flame of a civil war, coupled with fratricide and destruction, and a foreign war that brought about the death of 80,000 Iranian adolescents and the disabling of tens of thousands of other youths.

The Iranian Tudeh Party has directly cooperated with Khomeyni's regime in the genocide of the people--the people who were the strike force which overthrew (?the shah's regime). The Tudeh Party has endorsed the closing of the universities, donning of black by mourning women, decimating the country's judiciary, and (?establishing clerical domination) over the Justice Ministry, [words indistinct] of the legislative power and the establishment of the despotic principle of theocracy, adopting economic policies leading to financial bankruptcy, closing factories and, as a result, the rendering of millions of workers jobless and the delirious inflation and high prices. In short, it has endorsed all (?that which Khomeyni's regime) has done because finally, in the long run, all these are to the benefit of communism.

However, the USSR has not placed its commercial and industrial assistance, cooperation in the field of propaganda, and its organization of (?domestic) spying, information and (?other such) organizations at Khomeyni's disposal free of charge. All this assistance by the Soviet Union was not for people like Rabbani-Shirazi (?to) shout "death to communism." All this assistance was not for the regime to act in such a way for the United States to flagrantly announce that they will prevent its destabilization.

Should Moscow's payment be the tacit condemnation of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the massacre of the Muslim people of that country (?by Tehran officials) [words indistinct] in a bid to justify their Islamic propaganda? It is true that the Soviet Union and the Tudehis who believe in dialectic materialism support Mr Khomeyni's Islam, and it is also true that Comrades Kianuri and Ehsan Tabari (?in whose) [words indistinct] (?there is no doubt), clearly state in radio and television programs that their party walks in the line of the imam. But everything has its limits. The Islamic propaganda programs of Khomeyni's regime should only be aimed (?at chaining the calamity-stricken Iranian people in a medieval society) [words indistinct] and not [words indistinct] (?to remind) the Muslims of Azerbaijan SSR, Turkmen SSR, Tadzhik SSR and other Muslim Soviet republics of their ancestral religions. No. The Soviet Union too will maintain its presence on the scene and will not remain indifferent. The Soviet Union expects things which have tacitly been pointed out by PRAVDA. (?The same) [word indistinct] has been brought up by the United States, and Washington too has declared that it will maintain its presence on the scene.

Compatriots. Khomeyni's wretched anti-Iranian regime, which claims that it has broken the backs of the superpowers and made them kneel, has, by adopting incorrect domestic and foreign policies, (?granted permission) for intervention in Iran's domestic affairs. Does the main behind-the-scenes engineer of the recent developments in Iran, which was the main reason for the downfall of the monarchy and the coming to power of Khomeyni's regime--in other words, Great Britain, this (?impudent) colonialist--intend to carry out the plan for the partition of Iran and wants, through this, to fulfill the same program it had 50 years ago to cast its clutches on the northern and southern parts of the Persian Gulf?

The Iranian nation (?will thwart these old dreams). The Iranian nation will finally (?free itself) from the clutches of the black clerical despotism and take its destiny into its own hands. Iran's patriots and freedom-seekers depend neither on the dollars of U.S. spying organizations nor on the deceitful spy-like support of the Soviets. They will, with their own (?revolutionary power) and their devotion and self-sacrifice toward the homeland's independence, finally emerge as victors. The day when the tricolor lion and sun flag is hoisted again and the Iranian nation will live under it with pride is not far away. [Passage indistinct] Long live Iran! Long live the Iranian nation! Down with the criminal U.S., British and Soviet regime of Khomeyni.

CSO: 4640/193

CLANDESTINE ON BAHRAIN LIBERATION FRONT

NC121830 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 12 Mar 82

[Text] A Free Voice of Iran correspondent reports that (?17 Bahraini subjects) started a hunger strike Monday in the (Offices of Amnesty International) in Paris. This group, which apparently consists of members of the so-called Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, have said that the reason for their strike is the [word indistinct] arrest and trial of (?83) persons who have been arrested in Bahrain on charges of attempting a coup and cooperating with and spying for Khomeyni's Islamic regime.

It is necessary to recall that fronts supported by the Soviet Union, which formerly operated under the label of so-called liberation fronts, [words indistinct]. The headquarters of the so-called Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain is in Tehran, and Khomeyni's regime [words indistinct]. Some time ago this front sent several terrorists, with the cooperation of the Tehran regime, to Bahrain. The terrorists intended to carry out a coup there and establish a bloodthirsty regime like Khomeyni's regime after overthrowing the Bahraini rule.

In relation with [words indistinct] the Bahraini justice minister has announced that the trial of [word indistinct] arrested on charges of spying for and cooperating with Khomeyni's regime will (?begin on Saturday) in the Bahraini courts. He stressed that the defendants (?will be permitted) to defend themselves and to choose a defense lawyer.

We wish to recall that in Khomeyni's regime no one has the right to choose a defense lawyer or to defend oneself and many (?of the prisoners) are executed without trial.

CSO: 4640/194



DAILY EXPLAINS STAND ON PEACE MISSION

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 10 Mar 82 p 2

[Editorial by Zainab: "They Asked Us To Concede..."]

[Text]

It was only after Saddam realized that defeat is his inevitable fate, that he fell on his knees before the regional governments to find a solution that would prevent his downfall. The result was the presentation of this matter in the Islamic Conference and the formation of the peace mission comprising various heads of state from Muslim countries which quickly began its campaign of travelling between Baghdad and Tehran.

Throughout these comings and goings the Islamic Republic consistently stressed its just conditions for peace and it has repeatedly announced that an imposed peace is parallel to an imposed war and hence unacceptable. Contrary to what the mission and particularly the spiteful western media portrayed, Iran's position and the war were not a complex matter, for the stance of the Islamic Republic was totally clear and decisive from the start.

An aggression had taken place (on instigation of the U.S. imperialism) against the Islamic Republic, which had caused irreconcilable damages to both Muslim nations. The country under aggression had risen to defend itself and refused to retreat before the aggression was terminated. These conditions were reiterated by Iran during every one of the five trips that the peace missions had made to Iran; they constitute the most simple and obvious rights of any nation to defend itself.

However, the mission usually refused to understand, and then illustrated its impotence when it understood the stance of the Islamic Republic. This has led to the fifth trip (and major attempt) of the peace mission for an imposed peace on Iran.

These peace shuttles were in many ways reminiscent of the Camp David Mideast peace shuttles. They served as a rich propaganda source for the Iraqi and imperialist media. These trips were an attempt to soften and calm the militants and martyrdom loving attitudes of the nation. Still, they were welcomed on every instance, patiently listened to, briefed on the already evident stance of the Islamic Republic and seen off courteously.

These endeavors were no more effective than the overall

efforts of world arrogance to bring Iran to its knees and force it to surrender.

Reports concerning the recent trip of the peace mission and their discussion once again indicate that the mission is not totally devoted to seeking the truth but sacrifices the truth for its preferences and in simple words is just not fair. Hojjatoleslam Rafsanjani has stressed, following a lengthy meeting, that the mission's major mistake was that it expected the oppressed side to remit and concede. We deem that this concept needs further explanation.

In Islam, more than in any other monotheistic religion, forgiveness, and mercifulness are encouraged and praised. The most common attributes of God which are repeated more than any other in the Qur'an are Rahman and Rahim. Beneficent Compassionate, Forgiving. Rahman conveys this idea in the limited and specific sense and Rahim, in the vast all encompassing sense.

Numerous, narrations stress the ethics of forgiveness as the greatest of virtues, and as one of the characteristics of God which man should develop within himself. These narrations encourage man to forgive, when he is in a state of anger, to forgive when the ignorant insult and defame him and hence to forgive whenever his personal rights are trampled upon by an unrepentant or ignorant person. The stress is particularly laid upon the fact that an individual can only forgive the injustice and wrong done to himself and not to others.

Parallel to personal rights are the rights of the Naas (the people) which belongs to all of them. Above all these rights are the rights of God and of His absolute religion; Islam. Just as forgiving the violation of one's personal rights is encouraged, overlooking the rights of God and the masses is completely forbidden and logically unacceptable. An individual can overlook and forgive what rights belong to himself, but how can he possibly overlook the rights of the religion of God and the masses over which he has no control?

The peace mission has asked the Iranian officials to forgive and overlook the rights of 35 million Muslims to defend themselves and to retake their occupied cities and lands.

Today, after this long and drawn out endeavor, the peace mission has attested to the fact that Iraq must be only put under diplomatic pressure to accept justice. Ironically the peace mission has asked the Iranian leaders to remit the rights of over one million war stricken families who have been expelled from their homes and cities. They expected the Supreme Defense Council to overlook the rights of thousands of mothers, wives and children of martyrs who have sacrificed their dear ones in order that the Islamic Revolution might prosper and lay grounds for the revolution of Imam Mahdi (A.S.).

The peace mission has asked our dear people to overlook the rights of that six year old girl who has lost her limb in an Iraqi air raid over residential areas, and to overlook the rights of that mother who has given her beloved, the fruit of her life for the satisfaction of God.

The peace mission unrealistically has asked the Iranians to

overlook the rights of the Iraqi nation who suffer increasingly under the tyrannical reign of Saddam and who fight and become martyred alongside their Muslim brothers in the war-fronts.

Or does the mission demand that we remit the rights of God; of Islam, that we forgive the unprecedented aggression against the Islamic Republic, the assault on the rule of God, of Islam on earth? We cannot overlook the religion of Mohammad (S.A.W.A.) for the sake of an aggressor. We cannot make such concessions.

True, Islam encourages forgiveness, but never surrender to oppression. Islam considers the sin of the oppressor to be equal to the sin of those who submit to oppression.

In the case of Iraq, is it logical to overlook the crimes of the obstinate oppressor who insists upon his aggression and refuses to repent?

Don't these forms of concession further encourage and embolden the usurper to continue its act of aggression?

The Muslim Ummat has already tasted the bitter experience of such treacherous remittances in Camp David and the Fahd Plan. These impertinent forgivings set afire the suffering hearts of the downtrodden and oppressed and stir the wrath of God.

This is the logic which renders mediation in this war futile unless the oppressor surrenders. This is the logic of Imam Hussein (A.S.) which kindles the love for martyrdom and the vision of Allah, in the hearts of all. It is the logic of Imam Khomeini whose call warns the unconscionable that victory's not attained by the sword, victory is attained by blood, victory is attained by devotion to faith and love for martyrdom. This is the logic which safeguards the torch of Islam and truth. The blood of thousands of martyrs throughout history illuminates the dark passages of oppression. They have died to protect the truth and entrust it to the final torchbearer of humanity, Imam Mahdi (A.S.).



## ACHIEVEMENTS OF IRANIAN TECHNICIANS LAUDED

### Airplane Repair

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 8 Mar 82 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN, March 7 (IRNA) — Iranian Air Force technicians recently successfully repaired an F-4 fighter, which had been badly damaged. The plane had lost a wing in the early stages of the Iraqi imposed war on Iran and its wheels were completely destroyed when its pilot made an emergency landing.

Flight Colonel Akbar Sadiqi who piloted the planes after repair work, said in a TV program on Friday that the damage was such that normally only the U.S. manufacturing company could repair it. He said that the unprecedented repair work took 26,000 hours. After the test flight the Colonel said that the fighter could be once again used in defense operations

against the aggressions of the Iraqi regime. He stressed that the U.S. manufacturing company could hardly believe that such repair operations had been done in Iran since such work required a high level of specialization.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Feb. 1979, many Iranian factories were taken over and run by Iranians. The Sarcheshmeh Copper Complex was one of those being installed by the multinational Anaconda Corp., which then abandoned the work half-finished. Iranian engineers have recently put the giant complex into operation. Another example of ingenuity is the grand satellite station of Marabad, near Tehran, which is now being run by Iranian experts.

### University Jihad Efforts

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 7 Mar 82 p 8

[Text]

On the occasion of the third anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution the University Jihad issued a summary of its activities carried out in various fields, including 700 constructive plans.

The University Jihad was established after the formation of the Cultural Revolution Council, as its executive arm. With the activities of committed students and professors this foundation

began its activities after the closure of universities about 21 months ago.

Carrying out plans in the fields of medicine, technology, engineering, basic sciences and humanities, the University Jihad has been able to achieve remarkable success in both political and economic fields towards our nation's self-sufficiency.

In the introduction to this report it is stated:

The colonialistic culture should be converted into an independent culture. Yes, it was the message of the Imam who called his followers toward a big task: the cultural revolution and the halt of the dependent university system ... and in this way the movement commenced in spite of all the difficulties.

Shortly after the establishment of the Cultural Revolution Council, the University Jihad took form as the executive arm of this council so as to practically answer those who made distorted analysis of the university closures behind closed doors and who saw the move as an obstacle in the way of their sinister aims and motives.

It was in this way that we saw how the essence of universities increased after the stoppage of the dependent dominant system.

Notwithstanding the sabotage and the difficulties caused by the counterrevolution, the University Jihad has extended direct and indirect assistance to the governmental institutions and revolutionary foundations both in expertise and manpower ever since the closure of the universities.

Availing itself of limited facilities, the University Jihad has moved towards the realization of the Imam's message regarding the establishment of a culture independent of the West and the East.

By producing spare parts for the military vehicles and machines, the University Jihad has extended remarkable aid to the warfronts.

In addition to all these activities, the University Jihad has proposed about 700 constructive plans in the fields of medicine, agriculture, technology, engineering, basic science, and humanities, parts of which are mentioned in this article. It should be noted that at present these plans are being examined and carried out under the supervision of university professors and students throughout the country.

#### 1- Medical plans

— About 31 plans, rate of progress: 50% — examples:

A- Evaluation and measurement of the cholesterol HDL of

blood serum in predicting the dangers of heart diseases

B- Radiologic study on the dead faetus

#### 2- Pharmacological plans

— 47 plans, rate of progress: 60%

##### Samples:

A- Synthesis of the medical drug: Aldomet (anti-high blood pressure drug)

B- Synthesis of Tepidin from diethanolamine, a strong anodyne in surgery

#### 3- Veterinary Plans

— 16 plans, rate of progress: remarkable

##### Examples:

A- The using of powdered limestone instead of powdered mollusk shells in the food of poultry bred for their meat, especially due to the shortage of powdered shell. Cost of production: 2 rials per kilo.

B- The study and inspection of the causes of the death of fish and the bloody flux of sheep as well as the methods to control and prevent 70% of the sheeps early death.

#### 4- Agricultural Plans

— 68 plans, about 20 plans in preliminary stage, rate of progress: 40% in 20 plans and 95% in 28 plans

##### Examples:

A- Production of silkworm in the Sistan and Baluchestan Province (Southern Iran), for the first time in the township of Zabol.

B- Mechanization of cultivating and planting operations in vineyards.

#### 5- Chemical Plans

- 75 plans, rate of progress: remarkable

##### Examples:

A- Production of absolute alcohol: 99.9% from the 95% alcohol by means of lime (import cost: 14 to 44 million rials, cost of production: 9 times less). rate of progress: laboratorial phase finished.

B- Production of odorless kerosene from one of the extractions of petroleum without any need for foreign made apparatus or substances (import cost: 100 rials, cost of production: 50 rials)

6- Plans on Sociology

— About 50 plans, rate of progress : 40%

Examples:

A- Research on the migration of villagers and the ways to solve the problems of migration

B- Establishment of centers of Islamic research and literacy

7- Technical and Engineering Plans

— About 115 plans:

A- Electricity and electronics, rate of progress: 60%

Example: Fabrication of a booster for the current of coil in special military vehicles (import cost: Rials 35,000, cost of production: rials 2,500).

B- Development, rate of progress: remarkable

Example: Renovation of steam power plant belonging to the Tavanir Company.

C- Manufacture of Technical apparatus

Examples: Manufacture of transistor ued in all electronic and telecommunications devices.

— Manufacture of a clothes dryer (import cost: rials 1,500,000, cost of production: rials 150,000). One of these driers

is being used in the Imam Khomeini Hospital.

8- Plans in Technical and Engineering Physics

About 65 plans, rate of progress: 95%-40%

Examples:

A- Manufacture of artificial limbs

B- Fabrication of a device used in ultrasonic-therapy

9- Plans in Industrio-Chemical Engineering

—32 plans, rate of progress: 80%

Examples:

— Production of solid industrial paraffin from the paraffin consumed in the National Oil Company.

B- Production of hydrazine monohydrate (cost of production :

25% less than the imported type)

10- Physical Plans

5 plans, rate of progress : 30%

Examples:

A- Making use of solar energy for warming water, etc.

B- Establishment of foundries for making spare parts.

EVIN PRISON BECOMES 'MOHAMMAD RE-EDUCATION CENTER'

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 9 Mar 82 p 2

[Interview with Assadollah Lajevardi, Tehran Islamic Prosecutor, date and place not given]

[Text]

TEHRAN, March 8 (Dispatches) — The vast forbidding penitentiary on the northern heights overlooking Tehran that was formerly known as Evin Prison has changed its name in the past two weeks. It is now the Mohammad Re-education Center.

Behind the interminable perimeter wall running along hilly Evin Street, topped by barbed wire, guarded by watchtowers, and lit at night by sweeping searchlights, this correspondent met prisoners who professed to be grateful they were there — so grateful that they would think twice about leaving, even if given their freedom.

Conducted in person by Assadollah Lajevardi, the Tehran Islamic Prosecutor, a party of agency and television correspondents from France and Switzerland spent four hours in this incredible institution, which is remarkably successful in transforming militant enemies of the Islamic Revolution into ardent "Hezbollahis" — members of the Party of God.

The Mohammad Re-education Center, we were told, was named to commemorate the former prison's late governor, Mohammad Kashui, who was assassinated in June last year.

Mr. Lajevardi's manner was studiously jovial towards the reclaimed inmates, some of whom compared the place to a university.

We were escorted in a minibus to the Amuzeshgah block, showpiece of the re-educational operation, situated on a hill some distance from the main prison buildings.

On the way we passed a detachment of youthful prisoners who were also headed there for the evening prayer service. The youngest among them could not have been older than 15, and none of them appeared over 30.

Entering the Amuzeshgah block by a vestibule, the correspondents removed their shoes. The room was dominated by a portrait of Ayatollah Mohammed Hossein Beheshti, former leader of the ruling Islamic Republic Party and head of the Iranian Supreme Court, assassinated in a bomb explosion last June.

There were also revolutionary posters and photographs of mutilated prisoners said to have been tortured under the former regime of the Shah.

Ayatollah Beheshti's portrait was also in evidence in the great hall where worship was being conducted, as was another — six metres (18 feet) high — of Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran's revolutionary guide.

Here about 1,000 prisoners were gathered for prayer, the men on the left, and, segregated by a low curtain, the women on the right.

The men were for the most part scarcely more than youths,

their shaven heads covered in woolen caps. Behind the curtain the young women were veiled in the chador.

The prayers were intoned and the service ended in an abrupt uproar of religious cries and political slogans from 1,000 young voices — including the Islamic revolutionary battle-cry, "death to hypocrites"

As the prisoners dispersed, Mr. Lajevardi told of how the "hypocrites", successfully re-educated here, became bona fide Hezbollahis. Even the atheistic Marxists were now saying their prayers, he said.

The correspondents were taken around the cells. As the cameras whirled, Mr. Lajevardi chatted with the prisoners with ayuncular geniality.

In these cells, some of which accommodate nearly 30 prisoners, the faces of the inmates were cheerful.

Guards and prisoners appeared to be on the most friendly terms. The atmosphere was strangely reminiscent of a senior dormitory in a boys' school — anything but that of a prison in which some of those we saw were sentenced to spend much of their youth.

One cell contained 27 youthful former supporters of the left-wing Mujahideen Khalq movement. There was a shelf of Islamic literature. A stove to cook on, and a television set. Though they were obliged to sleep on the floor, the youths seemed cheerful enough.

Their talk turned on the regime's self-exiled opponents, former President Abol Hassan Banisadr and Mujahideen leader Masoud Rajavi, whom they denounced virulently.

The prisoners also spoke of themselves.

"I'm happy here," we were told by a youth of 19 who was serving 15 years' penal servitude.

Another young prisoner squatting on the floor confessed: "I want to stay on here afterwards to learn a trade."

Another said: "I used to think Mr. Lajevardi tortured people — it isn't so."

Mr. Lajevardi beamed in agreement.

At the close of the four-hour conducted tour he joked pleasantly with the correspondents. "Let me come to France — I'll reform your prisons for you," Mr. Lajevardi said.

## BRIEFS

BAKHTIAR ON RETURN PLAN--In a telephone conversation with us, Dr Shapur Bakhtiar has stated that, as always, he is determined to struggle with the bloodthirsty rulers of the Islamic Republic and that his only complaint is from so-called combatants and patriots. Dr Bakhtiar said: I never feared the mercenaries of prize winners of Khomeyni's Islamic Republic. My only complaint is from some so-called combatants who have risen to struggle against me instead of struggling against Khomeyni. Dr Bakhtiar added: I have repeatedly announced that my return to Iran is not the question. What I have propounded is Iran's independence and freedom. Dr Bakhtiar believes that some of the acts and exaggerated remarks by some opponents of the Islamic Republic, while to the benefit of patriots, in some cases disgrace and humiliate patriots and, ultimately, combatants. [Text] [NC161224 Westgate-On-Sea England E'DAM in Persian 5 Mar 82 p 1]

'INSTIGATORS' SENT TO IRAQ--The mullahs' regime intends to send a group of instigators to Iraq under the label of the families of the prisoners of war. This was said by one of the regime's information sources to our correspondent confidentially. This information source said that on the basis of a highly confidential plan which has been studied and approved by the mullahs' government, the regime has decided to send several of its instigators to Iraq together with the families of prisoners of war who will be going to that country via Kuwait and Turkey so that they can carry out so-called Islamic demonstrations there. Even though the accuracy or inaccuracy of this report is in doubt, reference should be made to remarks by the mullahs' foreign minister, 'Ali Akbar Velayati, who said that the Iraqi Government might not extend the necessary facilities for the prisoners of war families and that, at any rate, the Islamic Republic will carry out this program even if only unilaterally. This emphasis by Velayati shows that the mullahs' government is thinking of how to fulfill its propaganda objectives before truly pursuing humanitarian objectives. [Text] [NC131234 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 12 Mar 82]

ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF SHIRAZ OFFICIAL--The armed combatants opposing the regime of Khomeyni take advantage of every opportunity to execute the ruling mullahs and the so-called Friday imams in continuation of the revolutionary executions of mullahs, who are lackeys of the regime and mercenaries of Khomeyni. According to our correspondent, the people of Shiraz threw a firebomb at the house of a mullah supporting Khomeyni and set the house



on fire. Similar actions are being carried out by armed combatants throughout the nation against other leaders of the regime and the mullahs who are cooperating with this antinational regime. Many of the ruling mullahs have been forced to change their residences out of fear for the revenge of the Iranian people. However, the armed fighters will make the mullahs of the regime the target of their attacks wherever they are. [Text] [GF142013 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 14 Mar 82]

POW COMMITTEE MEETS RED CROSS--The Central News Unit reports that a meeting of the headquarters supervising the reception and dispatch of POWs' families was held yesterday evening in Tehran in the presence of the Red Cross Committee. At this meeting a 19-point proposal by the Islamic Republic of Iran was submitted to (Eric Cubel), the Red Cross Committee's representative. Kazempur-Ardebili, under secretary in charge of international affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recounted the steps taken by the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and said: In fact, this note is the basis for the exchange of POWs' families. He added: We ask the Red Cross to request the Baghdad regime to compose a similar proposal. At this meeting, Mr Zare', under secretary at the Ministry of the Interior and the head of the headquarters for the reception and dispatch of POWs' families, referred to the proposal made by Prime Minister Mir-Joseyn Musavi in connection with the visit by POWs' families. He said: This is an opportunity for the Red Cross to present itself as an organization which undertakes humanitarian activities. (Eric Cubel) said the International Red Cross Committee welcomes Iran's proposals and said he will send the text of the proposed plan and other related documents to Geneva so that Iraqi officials can be informed of them. Kazempur-Ardebili said at this session: We expect the International Red Cross to exert pressure on the Baghdad regime at the beginning of this program, or during the time it is carried out, to announce the names of those who have been captured by the Baghdad regime but who we have listed as missing. They must be included in this program, too. [Text] [LD151220 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 15 Mar 82]

RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ADDRESS CHANGE--The National Resistance Movement of Iran informs the people of Iran and especially its fellow combatants throughout the country that as of 21 March 1982 the address of the organization will be as follows: (?BT) 1006-16A, 75761 Paris, Cedex, 16 France. [Signed] The National Resistance Movement of Iran. [Text] [GF151453 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 15 Mar 82]

KHUZESTAN FRONT LEADER CITED--(Mahmoud Hussein Bachrari), secretary general of the "Ahvaz Arab Liberation Front," has announced in Paris the resumption of his movement's armed struggle against Tehran, with Iraq's support, aimed at "self-determination for the Arabic speaking population" of that oil province in southwest Iran. [Text] [PM121145 Paris LE FIGARO in French 11 Mar 82 p 4]

CSO: 4619/69

PROLONGED CRISIS DEPLORED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 256 16 Jan 82 pp 8-9

[Article by Ibrahim Salamah: "After the War, What?"]

[Text] Will Lebanon ever return to its former state, and will we ever return to it [Lebanon]? This question is repeated almost daily by the residents of Lebanon and those who have emigrated. The answer, as the proverb goes, "is like a suspended rope swinging in the wind." Every time a new president takes over in the U.S., or a UN official makes a speech, the Lebanese think their problem is over. Whenever a war erupts in any corner of the globe, they wonder whether their burden will be lifted soon. These are logical questions and understandable expectations of a people whose homeland is ravaged by a war which they do not understand.

A short time ago, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr said: "The key to the Middle East problem lies in finding a solution to the Lebanese crisis." This announcement set Lebanese youth inside and outside the country dancing with joy. "The U.S. Secretary of State has "remembered" them and has given "priority" to their problem," they proclaimed. In an opening editorial headlined, "Onslaught of American Winter," on 5 January, AL-'AMAL had this to say: "Basing their conclusions on the successive developments in the Middle East, astute observers of America's [foreign] policy report that President Reagan's Administration has begun its winter political offensive on the problem of the region [the Middle East] from all angles."

Let us assume that America has indeed launched its winter offensive, and that it is really serious about solving the Lebanese crisis. We ask two fundamental questions at the outset:

- (1) What type of a solution?
- (2) What is the basis of the solution?

We must assume that any American solution must be compatible with America's global strategic interests as well as with its regional interests. One need not be a genius to deduce America's ultimate objectives, which include challenging and blunting Soviet expansionism, establishing non-Socialist regimes in the Third World, protecting Israel (already amply protected), and



safeguarding the oil sources and pumping facilities. Based on this, what form might an American solution to the Lebanese problem take?

Under both Carter and Reagan, Washington has repeatedly affirmed its support for Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The inference, then, is that Washington will seek to restore control of the country to one legal authority. But how is that to be accomplished?

There are those who say quietly that the Syrian Deterrent Force [SDF] has been thinned considerably around the capital, Beirut, and that Syrian officials have informed some Arab rulers that they will be out of Lebanon before a new [Lebanese] president takes over. Excellent! Let us suppose that the Syrian force is withdrawn, and that by some magic means the PLO disappears from the streets of Beirut and southern Lebanon. How, then, will the Lebanese settle their problem? Will the Phalange Party, for example, surrender its weapons and close its offices as a courtesy to the new president, be his name Jean 'Aziz, Gabi Lahud or Sulayman Hanna? The leader of the Lebanese Forces, Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, has repeatedly said that "there will be no return to the past, i.e., the 1943 Concordat, because the events of the past 7 years have demonstrated the failure of that system."

We must conclude, then, that the Phalange Party, a key and active element in the struggle, has its own ideas on the shape of any future settlement. The same is true of the National Movement. But the latter's framework for a solution is 70 percent at odds with that of the Phalange Party. And this is only on the political aspects, to say nothing of the social and economic issues that divide them. What is the solution for the social-economic problems? Where is the economic program to deal with local and international economic crises? The Lebanese people, dazed by 7 years of tension and governmental anarchy, appear to have nearly forgotten these.

Should we have a Maronite president? Some people claim to have no objection provided other key government positions, such as the top army position, are distributed equitably. [Former] Prime Minister [not president, as text indicates] Taqi al-Din al-Solh has already said in a press interview that he has selected a Sunni officer as a candidate for the top army post. What do the Shiites have to say? Other questions: Should there be a referendum? A census?

If the Phalange Party has its reasons for declaring openly and in the press: "All indications are that the struggle in the coming months will revolve on the issue of who will succeed President Sarkis and who will benefit by the successor's policy and decisions," as appeared in the 5 January 1982 issue of *al-'AMAL*--which also added that the parties to the struggle were the same ones who had fought in the streets and on the hills of Lebanon--then the other groups must have reasons of their own. For just as the Phalange Party expresses what may be described as the "Christian public opinion," the other parties express, more or less, the "Muslim public opinion." Furthermore, each side is a prisoner of its own slogans. Neither the Phalange Party nor the other side can moderate its position or retreat from it. Yet both sides must get together in any eventual restoration. The question is: how?

Civil wars have traditionally ended with the victory of one side and the defeat of the other. This was the case, for example, in the civil war of 1917-22 between the Whites and the Reds in Russia, and in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 between the Republicans and the Blacks. The situation in Lebanon is completely different. The end of the war found each side in control of one part of the country. There was no decisive military victory. Thus all doors to negotiations are locked. The Phalangists will not negotiate with the "Communists," that is, the National Movement. They demand that the other side be represented by the "traditional Muslim leadership." The implication is that the Phalange Party demands the dissolution of the other side before negotiations can begin. The other side--the Lebanese faction, at least--knows that. For this reason, it has attached itself to a major power, the Soviet Union, and to some Arab countries that are friendly to Moscow. Muhsin Ibrahim, secretary general of the Central Council of the National Movement, succinctly portrayed his side's position in a famous remark: "We have no choice but to raise our voice constantly; otherwise, they would slit our throats from ear to ear."

Suppose, just suppose, that the American solution succeeds in eliminating the leftist groupings, and that the arena is cleared of all save non-leftist Islamic groups such as the Shiite Amal Organization and Ibrahim Qulaylat's Mrabitun. How would these make their presence count? How could they, in the simplest of reckonings, propose a formula for dividing and sharing [government] positions with the other side? Should the prime minister, for example, be Sunni or Shiite? What should be his duties? How about the top army position? These questions illustrate that we would be faced with nearly the same problems created by the 1943 Concordat. Then there is the problem of whether the constitution should be amended. Seven years of war have convinced many people that it is inconceivable to return to a 50-year old constitution. A new constitution reflecting the new realities of the war must be framed, they insist. How would a Maronite establishment, both civil and clerical, respond to this demand, which may well be American-inspired?

Three observations are in order before we close this discussion"

1. Who will account for the war crimes? Are they to be forgiven as things of the past or to be formally settled in the give-and-take of negotiations? And should this come to pass, what justifications remain for [continuing] the war?
2. What becomes of those who exploited the war to break the law, those who built houses without licenses, for example, or those who occupied other people's homes or expelled whole groups of people from their neighborhoods? Should these be included in a general amnesty? If so, what will be the reaction of those who remained faithful to the law, those who never transgressed the rights or property of others?
3. How do we create a homeland, settle the distribution of [government] positions, end the debate over the country's social structure, etc. until the physical boundaries of Lebanon are clearly and finally established with the consent of all citizens?

Although all of Lebanon's past explosions appeared to be rooted in social or political causes, they were in reality related to threats against its geographical boundaries, against its very existence as a geographical, political, international entity. At present, no one has addressed the subject seriously despite the fact that Lebanon's neighbors are yet to recognize officially the country's present or former borders.

Therefore, even assuming the existence of an American or European solution, Lebanon's problem is not as easy to solve as some imagine. Those who believe that heaven will rain manna, quails and happiness once a new president is elected and the Syrians withdraw are likely to be disappointed.

The country's leaders, on both sides, must put forward a blueprint for a homeland in which all people can coexist, not temporary stopgap measures to solve this or that crisis. In the absence of a comprehensive solution the people are likely to get ready for war again and again. Other nations are likely to "volunteer" assistance to this or that faction, and we will be caught in a whirlpool of fighting, killing and fragmentation.

All people, on both sides, are weary of war, destruction and terror. They, like the Algerians did in 1962, are saying "7 years is enough."

Our warlords bear the major responsibility. They have the power to deliver us or continue the fighting.

A new Lebanon? How?

The old Lebanon? Why?

These are the two questions with which to begin the debate [on reconciliation]. Here we must take the first step toward the future.

9063

CSO: 4404/254

# COLLAPSE OF SECURITY MEASURES DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 257, 23 Jan 82 p 25

[Article: "Who Will Restore Security to West Beirut?"]

[Text] Dr Samir Sabbagh, head of the Joint Security Task Force--a group attached to the National Movement--has offered to let the Command Council of the Murabitun [Organization] decide the fate of his proffered resignation. The reason for his action is that he already belongs to the National Movement and is its deputy commander. Dr Sabbagh reportedly asked the Command Council to accept his resignation from the Joint Security Task Force, which was created to restore security to anarchy-dominated West Beirut. The resignation offer, an admission of failure, comes in the wake of the Western zone between the Communist Labor Organization headed by Muhsin Ibrahim, the secretary general of the National Movement, and the Shiite Amal Organization, which is opposed to any form of self-security measures in the Nationalist Zone, and demands that security be under control of the legal authority.

Government security officials in the past few days have been closely monitoring the stream of negative reaction from various political quarters, all deploring the violence which destroyed residential neighborhoods and caused the death of innocent people, and demanding that the government assume its responsibility for security in the anarchy-dominated western-zone.

It is generally believed that the government's satisfaction with the political reaction to the violence is not attributable to the government's perception of a growing rejection of lawlessness or its relief over the unanimity of condemnation and the demand that it assume its rightful role with respect to security matters, but rather to a perception that there is a growing public opposition to the presence of illegal, armed groups in the western zone and a mounting anger directed at the parties and organizations which possess the arms. It is generally accepted that the worse the security situation becomes in West Beirut and the other areas under the control of the Palestinians, the National Movement and the Arab Deterrent Force [ADF], the more extensive will public opposition to illegal groups and organizations become, a development that will benefit the government politically.

In particular, such a development could lead to the surrender of illegal weapons, withdrawal of armed groups from towns and restoration of the

government's jurisdiction over security, in the context of a comprehensive solution acceptable to all factions, and recognizing the Lebanese Army as the legal instrument for the maintenance of security.

It was evident that the government failed to heed the demand to assume its security responsibility because those who made the demand--at least most of them--had insisted that internal security forces [police] be used to quell the violence and not the Army, the government's choice. The Army is still not acceptable to certain political groups.

The only thing to emerge clearly out of the furor over the violence that had reduced the residential sections of West Beirut to a theater of armed confrontations, demolitions, assassinations and other forms of liquidations is an attempt by some government agencies and their allies to revive the Greater Beirut Proposal, under which all illegal weapons be banned from the capital.

The attempt was evidently aimed at assessing whether the escalation of violence had reduced the opposition of certain parties to the idea of banning illegal weapons from Beirut. The trial balloon, however, soon convinced the government that opponents of the proposal have not yet changed their position. This does not mean that the government has given up on the proposal, but rather that the proposal would be shelved until a more suitable political climate prevails. It must be noted that the proposal, as already drawn up, is the blueprint for any future solution, not only in connection with security, but also in terms of easing economic, geographic and living space problems in the city.

In the wake of the National Movement's failure to restore security in West Beirut, the urgent question now is what is to be done. It is apparent that the security measures announced by Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzaw after a meeting of the Internal Security Council and all other security agencies chaired by him in his capacity as minister of Internal Affairs will not work. While a temporary truce appears to be holding in this large and important part of Beirut, the underlying situation has not changed and an eruption could be sparked any moment.

During the last meeting held jointly by the Islamic Coalition and the National Front for the Preservation of the South [Southern Lebanon], and attended by Mr al-Wazzan, the prime minister came under heavy criticism by prominent Muslim political leaders. In the ensuing debate in which the conferees unequivocally rejected the proposal for self-security which the National Movement attempted to implement, the prime minister and the government were accused of being in league with the National Movement by using the media to represent the arrangement as an acceptable substitute for the government's role in maintaining order and security and protecting the lives of citizens. The conferees went on to support a proposal by [former] Prime Minister Sa'ib Salan, calling on the government to take decisive action to see to it that government internal security forces assume responsibility for enforcing strict security measures with the support of the ADF before it is too late.



The Islamic Coalition in concert with the National Front for the Preservation of the State also endorsed a proposal by Sa'ib Salam to demand that the Palestine Resistance Movement to implement the 14 articles agreed to earlier after lengthy negotiations in Damascus. The agreement referred to provides for shutting down offices and armed centers and includes a ban on carrying weapons and other activities of a provocative nature.

Mr Salam expressed the view that the implementation of the agreement endorsed by the Palestine Resistance Movement and Syria would enable the government, supported by the ADF, to restore the needed security.

9063

CSO: 4404/254

RENEWAL OF ADF MANDATE DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 256, 16 Jan 82 p 14

[Article: "Will Sarkis Renew ADF Mandate for Last Time?"]

[Text] During his most recent visit to Beirut, secretary general of the Arab League al-Shazli al-Qulaybi asked the Lebanese Government to request an extension of the ADF mandate in Lebanon. Mr al-Qulaybi reportedly told Mr Sarkis and senior Lebanese officials that he would convene a meeting of the Arab League to decide on the Lebanese request before the end of this month, specifically following the meetings of the Arab Follow-Up Committee. The secretary general's request came as a surprise to certain quarters in Lebanon and fueled speculation as to why the request was made in view of the fact that the application [to extend the ADF mandate] had already been prepared and that no one had objected to it. The common belief before the secretary general's visit was that the request for extension would be made [and approved] without a hitch as in the past. For some time now, President Sarkis, in private and [public] political meetings, has been saying that this would be the last time he would request extending the ADF mandate, and that future requests would be made by the next president. Mr Sarkis also made it clear that he would leave the next president free to renew or not to renew the request for extension.

It is noteworthy that this is one of the few times that a request for extending the ADF mandate would be made without a political uproar from those who are opposed or those who want a conditional extension. It is also one of the few times that the request has not been accompanied by "reservations" on the part of some Arab countries as has been customary in the past. Speaking before the Kuwaiti Parliament, Kuwait's foreign minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah praised the role of the ADF in ending the Lebanese crisis. This development is in contrast to past experience when Kuwait, in past Arab League meetings, would lead the opposition against unconditional extension and underscore its opposition by issuing political statements or withholding financial assistance. The Kuwaiti attitude was evidence that the Arab world was divided over the role of the ADF in Lebanon.

9063

CSO: 4404/254

TUNISIAN UNCERTAINTIES ANALYZED

Paris LE MONDE in French 17, 18, 19 Feb 82

[Article by Paul Balta: "Tunisia of the Uncertainties"]

[17 Feb 82 pp 1, 5]

[Text] For his first official visit to a Third World country, Pierre Mauroy chose Tunisia, where he will be from Thursday until Saturday, 18-20 February. With his interlocutors, including President Bourguiba, the prime minister, who gives his choice political significance, will hold talks on the regional situation and bilateral cooperation. He will be accompanied by three ministers: Mrs Nicole Questiaux (National Solidarity), Alain Savary (National Education), and Andre Henry (Leisure).

On the eve of that visit, we begin the publication of a three-part article analyzing the situation in Tunisia since the legislative elections on Sunday, 1 November 1981.

I. Rites, Intrigues and Realities

Gabes--Pliny had boasted the gentleness of the climate and the fine sands of this once Carthaginian commercial center, surrounded by an oasis with the unique privilege in all the Maghreb of extending to the edge of the sea. A port for southern Tunisia, where Sidi Bouibaba, barber to the Prophet Muhammad, ended his days in the 7th century, Gabes seemed destined to remain an agricultural and commercial center without any great future until Ahmed Ben Salah, then minister of economy and the founder of the short-lived cooperative system, decided, despite the general skepticism, to make it the country's main industrial pole after Tunis, at the end of the 1960's.

The modernist adventure began with the official opening, in 1972, of the Maghreb-ian chemical industries complex and the hope aroused by oil in the Gulf of Gabes, part of which Libya claims. Today, this governorate capital of 90,000 inhabitants is in the image of that "Tunisia of the paradoxes" which, by dint of having piled up contradictions, has become the Tunisia of uncertainties. The city has

definitely met the challenge of development. It also has the most radical trade unionists and the most turbulent interests. As a counterbalance, the Destourian Socialist Party (PSD), in power for a quarter of a century, has some of the most loyal members. Is this mixture, found in the rest of the country in varying proportions, as explosive as the oppositions claim? And how important are these oppositions themselves?

On the occasion of the first official visit, in April 1980, of Prime Minister Mohamed M'zali since his appointment, all Gabes seemed to have gone out into the streets. Did the PSD organization encourage the people to turn out? It is possible, but it could neither have forced them to climb on the walls and throng together on the terraces nor to have manifested their joy. Sneaking by the police, a few old men and women thrust themselves forward to stick requests into his hand. Ignoring the entreaties of his bodyguards, M'zali shook hands and happily plunged into the crowd.

The same scene was repeated in nearby El Hamma, the home town of Mohamed Ali, founder of the General Confederation of Tunisian Workers, formed in 1924, and of the writer Tahar Haddad, author of "Our Women" (1930), an early essay on the emancipation of women. It was scene again in Kebili, on the edge of the desert, recently named as capital of the governorate, where Bourguiba was exiled by French authorities in 1934; in the oasis of Douz, where the prime minister allowed a Scout scarf to be placed around his neck; at the Sabria oil drilling site, where nomads applauded him as he put on the Saharan *sinwal* (baggy pants) and wrapped the khaki *cheche* around his head.

Along an isolated road, angry farmers vehemently demand water, just as others had done with more discretion at the governorate headquarters. He told the technicians and administrators: "We have to give them the water they so rightly demand and of which they are deprived by the factories. There is enough underground. We have to buy or rent the drilling rigs we need. It is a matter of a political choice."

Warm, simple, direct, M'zali has contact with the people, who have known him since the time when, first as minister of education and then of health, he laid the cornerstones for buildings and complexes he is now opening: the regional 220-bed hospital which, he recalls, "seemed to be a distant dream in 1973," or the new facilities of the Gabes Engineering School (ENIG), whose first class graduated in 1979 and which would probably never have been built or have reached its high level without the contribution of scientific institutions in Toulouse. "When completed, the school had cost 9 million dinars (1 dinar = 11.3 francs), according to estimates, but the cost of the hospital tripled because of middlemen and trafficking. We must learn our lesson from this," he publicly confessed, emphasizing one of the country's headaches.

Athletic -- he trains five hours a week and would have become president of the International Olympic Committee if he had not been named prime minister -- M'zali walks quickly, just as Bourguiba did 15 years ago, considering the exercise to be "good for the muscle tone" of the ministers and officials who puff after him. And like the supreme combattant, M'zali, a modernist in Arab culture and of Muslim sensitivities, knows how to be both didactic and make people laugh.

When his attention is drawn to the clever architectural design that protects the ground-floor windows of a new complex, he replies: "You wouldn't have needed it if you had given the children a playground. Sports do not mean 22 players kicking a ball around, but school children and workers playing in a stadium. If we are not careful, soccer may bring tribalism back here." At a high school where, in keeping with his instructions, manual arts are taught, he tastes honey taken from a beehive set in the trunk of a palm tree, according to tradition, and tries out a desk made by students. He recalls: "Tunisia also needs carpenters and plumbers. We have seen that manual workers with their high school diploma have less problems with unemployment." In order to meet demand, Tunisia must in fact create 60,000 jobs a year, nearly 200 a day, a challenge for a country with 6.5 million inhabitants.

Before PSD members meeting at the People's Palace and in the front row of which is Sassi Lassouad, one of the most famous *fellaghas* of the fight for independence, M'zali uses language that touches these men because he sums up the region's, as well as the country's, problems. "Industry has helped uproot the peasants. It has created moral and civilization problems. Young people are leaving the land for the factories. We must create a cultural and sports environment without checking industrial development. But our future is agriculture. In the past, it was neglected, just like the south. I would personally place my bet on both."

Paradoxically enough, he, who was the champion of pluralism before the legislative elections of 1 November, now takes a harsher tone: "I make no distinction between the administration and the party. We still need to have the party identified with the government." He calls on the PSD to regenerate itself by serving the people, but also defends its action and jokes at the expense of the opposition: "They say that dogs are barking and that the caravan is going by, but I would say that they are forced to follow the caravan. At any rate, the barking of dogs is less disagreeable than the braying of donkeys." Nor is the rejoinder long in coming: His opponents accuse him of yielding to "totalitarian temptations."

#### Rules of the Game

The truth is that today as before, the politicians, whether or not they are in power, make sacrifices to the rites while totally giving way to intrigue. The crowd that applauds and proclaims M'zali just as imperturbably cries "Long live Bourguiba," at the risk of surprising the visitor unacquainted with the rules. When Habib Achour, leading figure in the Tunisian General Federation of Labor (UGTT), was released from prison a few months ago, he made incredible efforts to prevent enthusiastic workers from carrying him on their shoulders. M'zali is protected against such a misadventure by his bodyguards. Any leader accepting such an honor, tacitly reserved for the commander in chief, would be committing the crime of *lese-majeste*, for which he would pay dearly..

Opposition groups reproach the prime minister for not remaining sufficiently aloof from the president and for resorting to such formulas as: "Whether we went to the Sorbonne or somewhere else, our real school is the Bourguibian school." But they are careful not to criticize the chief of state. Privately, everyone accuses him of having checked the democratization process, but publicly, it is



M'zali who is charged. And when, by virtue of his populism, the "most Bourguibian" of the prime ministers awakens support for the regime from a population whose economic and cultural level, despite areas of gloom and poverty, leads to demands for more democracy, his adversaries hasten to go whisper at Carthage Palace: "Habib wants to take your place." They know that even though he is in his 80's, the chief of state remains jealous of his prerogatives and does not intend to yield an ounce of power in this country that has changed radically in a quarter of a century and 65 percent of whose people are under 25.

But what is the true importance of these court intrigues and Byzantine maneuvers in the face of the real conditions? The real conditions are the trade union in Gabes, whose 7,000 workers have an average age of 27, at least 5 years of secondary school, who scarcely identify with the old leaders and who demand other trade union officials, more social justice and new methods of government. The real conditions are the growing class of the *nouveau riche*, but they are also the "galley slaves in the mines."

[18 Feb 82 p 5]

[Text] Prime Minister Mohamed M'zali proposes a kind of society halfway between the cooperative socialism of the decade from 1960 to 1970 and the "uncontrolled" liberalism of the following decade. However, he has to contend with political intrigue and harsh economic and social conditions (LE MONDE, 16 February).

## II. The Galley Slaves in the Mines

Gafsa--"Yes, it is true. After work, we go get drunk, but just take a look around. What else is there to do?" In Muslim Tunisia, however emancipated it may be, the reaction of this Mdila miner, some 10 kilometers from Gafsa, produces a definite shock. One understands him better after spending a few hours here or in the other phosphate centers such as Metlaoui and Redeyef: a real nightmare. Even in winter, one's mouth is dry. One's hair, clothes and body are covered with phosphate dust. Everything is grey and dusty, as far as the eye can see. The few trees one sees are also grey and look as if they were made of paper mache.

In Mdila, as close as it is to Gafsa, one is at the end of the earth. The section known as "the barracks" has only one public fountain. One wonders what the people do in the summer, when the heat is torrid and when the dust sticks to the skin. Antennas sticking up over the porches of ramshackle houses are evidence that television is the only luxury and the only distraction.

Not far away, protected by fences, are the villas of the engineers and upper-level personnel. They have inherited a swimming pool and tennis courts from colonial times. Today, their salaries vary between 300 and 600 dinars a month, plus a moving bonus of 500 dinars to provide them with incentive to come. We stopped halfway, before sordid huts. A door opened and two men staggered out. Seeing us, they leaned on the wall in order not to fall down. Inside, one could discern the figures of a few miners drinking cheap red that costs a dinar a bottle. Based on their skills and seniority, they earn between 60 and 120 dinars a month, when the interoccupational minimum growth wage is about 50.

Not one stadium, not one movie theater, not one public park or summer camp for children, not a single surgeon, just one or two doctors for 4,000 people. The company has not even provided showers at the pit head! Mdila is both a hell and a slaughterhouse. "It is a place forsaken by God," the residents say. Nor is this a recent phenomenon. In 1937, major strikes broke out in the region. Militant Hedi Nouria wrote in L'ACTION TUNISIENNE, the Neo-Destourian weekly, an article entitled "The Galley Slaves of the Mines." It created a sensation and is said to have caused the bloody events of 9 April 1938, which resulted in a hardening of colonial policy.

We went to Mdila and the other centers 10 years ago. Nouria was prime minister for 10 years, from 1970 to 1980. All these mining settlements have the same depressing look and nothing has really changed. Destiny? Remoteness? Whatever the case, the fight for independence began in the mountains around Gafsa, where the Communist Party has its roots -- it launched the slogan "Tunisia for Tunisians" at the time -- and it now has its main base there, with five cells. Agitation has never really known any respite and the commando squad of Tunisian rebels trained and armed in Libya attacked precisely that city on 26-27 January 1980 in the hope of lighting a spark that would put the entire country in flames and bring about a change in regimes.

The headquarters of the Tunisian Communist Party cell -- a cement cubicle near the cafe in downtown Mdila, attracts a few oldtimers from colonial days and mainly young people. Posters on the wall show Lenin and verses from the Koran. "I am not a communist," one says, "but where are we supposed to go to reflect on our problems and discuss them?" For 2 hours, all subjects are mulled over, without any concessions. Everyone agrees that "in Poland, unfortunately, it is not true socialism and in Tunisia, we would like a socialism different from what is practiced in the USSR."

One member concludes: "I am pessimistic about the future of our country if there is no change." The teacher agrees, but adds: "I have been teaching since 1968 and great steps have been taken in 15 years. Children are no longer the same. They are better fed and more aware. The ratio of forces is changing." Aside from this one confident note, the language is harsh. Among noncommunists, it is sometimes desperate. Strangely enough, the members of the PSD and the UGTT are not the least aggressive. One of them explains: "Even if we elect other political and union leaders, the results would be the same because tribal influence remains powerful and the government plays on it in order to have those who serve it appointed."

#### Opening Up the Region

The secretary general of the regional UGTT union, Mohamed Alimi, did explain, however, that the trade union had been negotiating since December with company officials in order to draft a code that would solve the problems of the 13,500 workers in housing, health and leisure time. But the workers we talked with were sarcastic: "They told you that? Well, we'll see. In the meantime, we have seen that he got a promotion and that he is now with the engineers. He has gone over to the side of management and the government." They then cite the example of the regional

union in Gabes, led by Habib Guiza, which is fighting to preserve the independence of the union, to enable all factions to be expressed and to defend a progressive line.

One of the main concerns of Governor El Taief is to open up the region in order to attract upper-level personnel, who want to be able to go easily and rapidly to Tunis or Sfax or Gabes, reduce the feeling of isolation of the people, increase the number of tourists attracted by the two Roman swimming pools and rug manufacturing, and finally, facilitate the marketing of agricultural products, which has increased considerably since the introduction of underground cultivation now spreading in the south.

#### Neglected Zone

In 2 years, in fact, deep wells make it possible to install 652 greenhouses, an airport is being built, a railroad is planned between Gafsa and Gabes, 3,000 housing units have been built, along with several small factories, and the number of banks has risen from 2 to 10. The municipality's budget has leaped: From 100,000 dinars at the time of independence, it reached 4 million in 1981-1982, but one may well wonder if the fear caused by the Gafsa commando raid did not speed up reforms undertaken and inspire certain aspects of the Sixth Plan for 1982 to 1987 that will go into effect in June.

Minister of Planning and Economy Mansour Moalla admits that the region has been neglected, but he emphasizes that the Phosphate Company registered losses of some 30 million dinars in 10 years, even if it did improve its situation recently. In order for it to become profitable, it should double production, which is some 5 million tons a year. In his opinion, this is possible, provided that 3,000 workers who are either older or in poor health are retired early and that facilities are modernized, which presumes large investments that only the government or large financial institutions can make.

"It is true," he says, "that in the course of the two preceding decades, emphasis has been placed on coastal areas in the east, which are easier to develop and at a lower cost than the northwest and the interior. It was human and quite logical. We now have a good base from which to develop the regions that are deprived because they are poor or far away. It would have been more difficult and more costly to do the opposite."

He also notes that while the decade from 1960 to 1970, that of the cooperative socialism of Ben Salah, achieved growth of only 4 percent and created only 134,000 jobs, it was because it was devoted to providing the country with infrastructures from which the following decade, that of the "uncontrolled liberalism" of Nour, to use the expression of the opposition, benefited. "That period permitted the creation of 400,000 jobs, but it also engendered businessmen who got rich suddenly," Moalla admits, hastening to add: "It must now make adjustments."

He defends himself against those who reproach him and M'zali for not having any proposed society and for being less voluntarist than at the time the Cabinet was formed nearly 2 years ago: "We want to maintain the government sector," he explains, "without its being too predominant, so as to prevent bureaucracy. We

intend to preserve the private sector, which creates jobs, but prevent it from being too anarchic. Finally, despite the handicap of its current discredit, we want to rehabilitate the cooperative movement, particularly in agriculture, fishing, handicrafts and services. But this time, we shall avoid past errors and give the cooperatives the means to develop, thanks to the creation of a fund to facilitate their establishment."

He also emphasizes that the plan, which provides for 8 billion in investments, proposes eight major reforms. The first concerns education, with the institution of school attendance for nine years, which will make it possible to better orient the young when they leave the system at the age of 15 or 16. Among other things, the remaining reforms recommend administrative decentralization, better social welfare benefits, the creation of major financial and banking institutions, encouragement of handicrafts and the minor trades (mechanics, plumbing, carpentry, and so on). The minister admits that the fiscal reform, which is to distribute deductions and the burden more equitably, will be the most difficult to implement, "but," he says, "it is indispensable and we shall succeed, despite the resistance."

It remains to be seen whether political power will be strong enough in the face of the power of money and how far the dissent of the young will go.

[19 Feb 82 p 6]

[Text] Prime Minister Mohamed M'Zali proposes a kind of society that is halfway between the cooperative socialism of the decade from 1960 to 1970 and the uncontrolled liberalism of the following decade. However, he must face harsh economic conditions, the dissatisfaction of the trade unions, political intrigues and the hostility of the privileged classes to the indispensable reforms (LE MONDE, 17, 18 February). Given this situation, how are young people reacting?

### III. Youth: The Unknown Factor

Tunis--What a contrast between the Tunis drawing rooms with their exaggerated ostentation, the political staffs where a kind of Florentine court atmosphere sometimes reigns, the streets of the often well-founded rumors, and the "real" country, where the traditional courtesy and hospitality have trouble masking the harshness of daily life. One has but to go some 20 kilometers, coming from the western suburbs to the capital, to have a glimpse of the contradictions and ambiguities of Tunisia.

In Carthage, where the presidential palace is found, sumptuous villas are also seen, sometimes thanks to unacknowledgeable injustices and to scorn for precious archeological vestiges that are rapidly disappearing. Built by the new class of millionaires, they are increasingly arrogant, as in Sidi-Bou-Said and La Marsa. As one approaches the capital, they become more modest. Then one comes on the luxurious buildings in the new El Menzah section, where, in apartments costing between 30,000 and 60,000 dinars to buy, the upper-level personnel and officials from the private sector and the government live.



Once one has reached the Bab-Saadoun university campus, medium-rent housing for lower government employees is found. Beyond, one enters the "lower districts," "lower" both literally and figuratively. There, among the huts of Melassine and Sedjoumi and the nameless shantytowns, one has the impression of being in the hellhole of Mdila.

In a quarter of a century, a middle class has definitely emerged, but the poorest people still wonder by what miracle some of their neighbors, who were not better off than they in the beginning, have become millionaires so fast. This sudden wealth, too frequently easy and not always honest and sometimes realized with the tacit complicity of the government, has its effect on the rest of society. Engineers demand increases of 200 dinars, four times the minimum interoccupational wage, while the term "bizness," a synonym for "D system," is the favorite word of the unemployed.

In order to face these social problems, inflation, the drought, the regional imbalance, political measures are needed. However, at the government level, the different clans clash more and more frequently, planning for the succession. The law states that the prime minister, who is also secretary general of the PSD, succeeds the chief of state if power is vacant. Some have therefore had the idea, in order to open up the range of choices, of creating a vice presidency of the party, which would go to a "strong man," while others are more simply trying to get the incumbent out in order to take his place at the right time.

This context explains the irregularities that tainted voting on 1 November 1981 and brought about great frustration in the country. "In the days preceding the election," one high official told us, "the governors' reports told of some disaffection for the PSD. In the capital and its suburbs, Ahmed Mestiri's Socialist Democratic Movement was likely to gather 30 percent of the votes, and the Communist Party between 10 and 15 percent. They went crazy. The first reaction was therefore to guard the house."

Our interlocutor admitted that orders were given in high places. The man in the street gave names, spoke of the wife of the president or of the minister of interior, who reportedly said later, "I was the one who saved the regime." At any rate, it is certain -- as we personally observed -- that local authorities, fearing for their future, sometimes manifested such stormy zeal that in several regions, the government cannot ascertain the true results. It also happened that "those nostalgic for authoritarianism" discreetly encouraged "sabotage" in order to hinder the prime minister through the failure of the new openness. "How can they talk of a multiparty system," they now exclaim, "when the opposition has shown its inconsistency?"

The Tunisian Communist Party, the only opposition party that is recognized, thereby enjoys a slight advantage. It is said that the president hopes that with the UGTT, he will counterbalance the influence of the Islamic faction, whose leaders are in prison, and that at the same time, the trade unionists, under the umbrella of Habib Achour, known for his anticommunism, will form a counterweight to the communists militants. As for the MUP-I (Popular Unity Movement) of Ahmed Ben Salah, still in exile, which boycotted the elections, and the MUP-II and MDS,



which participated in it, they are all hindered in their action by the countless administrative difficulties they face.

### Triple Calculation

The government plays the cards it holds with a certain Machiavellianism. The recognition of opposition factions as political parties now depends, in fact, on the good will of the chief of state. The Ministry of Interior recently seized DEMOCRATIE for an interview with Ben Salah, who is quite moderate, but rumors from Carthage immediately hinted that the former minister of economy could soon receive amnesty, just like Achour, who regained all his rights at the end of November.

By making a gesture in behalf of the latter, the president was apparently making a triple calculation: first of all, neutralizing the UGTT, which, despite its splits, had once again become the main force in the country, by pitting the former leader, promoted to the post of honorary president, against the new secretary general, normally elected at the Gafsa congress in April 1981, Taieb Baccouche; next, trying to obtain a lull on the social front, which was becoming increasingly radical; and finally, eclipsing Mestiri, who had stolen the show since the beginning of the election campaign.

The opponents count up the positive aspects of the election campaign and the risks of explosion. "We proposed change but not an upheaval. By blocking the process of pluralism, the government is giving free rein to extremists and the military. Furthermore, it offers no credible alternative to young people. The rank and file have become extremely aggressive. This is the first time since independence that the teaching corps, considered to be a pillar of the regime, has gone out on strike. The social fabric is coming apart. That shows how much the situation has deteriorated," Mestiri told us.

Inversely, the supporters of pluralism within the government emphasize that the election campaign has come to a turning point, so that "nothing is as it was before." According to them, even those who consider that the Chamber was poorly elected must admit that the tone of the deputies has changed, when compared with their predecessors. The fact is that they demanded general amnesty, revision of the press code, installation of a constitutional council, elimination of the State Security Court and the opening of investigations in order to shed light on the elections of 1 November and the events of 26 January 1978.

They also point out that the opposition newspapers are more numerous than those of the PSD. The organs of the MDS, AL MOUSTAKBAL, and its French version, L'AVENIR, reportedly have a circulation of 20,000 and 10,000 copies, respectively. The Tunisian Communist Party weekly is reportedly between the two. Over 800 foreign dailies and periodicals, including 400 in French and 200 in Arabic, are sold without censorship.

## Masmoudi Case

Another sign of change: In disgrace since the abortive Tunisian-Libyan merger of January 1974, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Masmoudi has recently recovered his passport and gone to Mecca on a pilgrimage. It is true that the government yielded to the urgent entreaties of Saudi Arabia, a major backer, which reportedly considered proposing his candidacy for the post of secretary general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, inasmuch as the term of Habib Chatti, who recently underwent open-heart surgery, was soon to come to a close.

"All of that is very little compared with what the people expected," Habib Achour told us with contained vehemence. "What can a newspaper do without the support of a recognized party? Shout. And then what? If the deputies have changed, it is because they feel protected by the UGTT. Our trade union has gained a strength it did not have before 26 January 1978. And above all, it has many young people. They are not afraid of going to prison. They are an active, combative force." Its current secretary general, Baccouche, is a symbol of it. But that youth also represents an unknown, for the trade union as well as for the country.

Secretary general of the Tunisian Communist Party, Mohamed Harmel also believes that the ratio of forces has changed. "The chief of state can no longer count on the PSD to carry out his policy, but must get along with forces that are not his own, such as the UGTT, the PCT, the MDS," he told us. Nevertheless, unlike others, he believes that M'Zali is not threatened, even if his image has been eroded somewhat. "Bourguiba does not like to change prime ministers and he has had only three since independence, each one of which has corresponded to a policy," he said.

The fact is that Bahi Ladgham and his minister of economy, Ben Salah, built the infrastructure and tried the cooperative experiment, while Nour, taking the opposite tack, favored economic liberalism and the establishment of a middle class. Today, M'Zali's mission is to regain political pluralism and try to bring about greater social justice. "There is no alternative solution, except that of forming a government of national unity, with all political factions," Harmel concludes.

The idea of such a government is common to most opposition groups, although it is not easy to bring about. Furthermore, it leaves many young people skeptical. "Unfortunately," one nonconformist intellectual told us, "our opponents are themselves imbued with the political mores of the regime, even though they denounce them. It is not certain that they would act differently if they came to power. That is why one cannot exclude the possibility that young people may one day express their hopes and their rejection through violence. One would then see the emergence of a Red Brigade-type phenomenon and its Islamic version, with Muslim Brother terrorists." Between this pessimistic vision, shared by a minority of young people, and the optimistic populism of M'Zali, which his rivals in power and the opposition dispute, Tunisia now enters a period of questioning.

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